CHAPTER 2

Emotion as Stance

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In the midst of doing things together, participants display how they align themselves toward other participants with whom they are interacting (as well as to their actions). In Goffman's (1981) terms, they display their stance, footing, or their "projected selves." Ochs (1996, p. 410) defines affective stance as "a mood, attitude, feeling and disposition, as well as degrees of emotional intensity vis-à-vis some focus of concern."[1] In this chapter we develop the notion that the display of emotion is a situated practice entailed in a speaker's performance of affective stance through intonation, gesture, and body posture (Goodwin & Goodwin, 2000).

ANALYTIC FRAMEWORKS FOR INVESTIGATING EMOTION

The expression of emotions as an evolutionary and psychological process situated within the individual

Our analysis of emotion as stance is markedly different from the way in which emotion is theorized and investigated in much other contemporary research (Russell & Fernández-Dols, 1997).[2] In a tradition extending back to Charles Darwin (1872/1998) and given powerful life in the work of Ekman (1993, 2006; Ekman & Friesen, 1969), emotions are conceptualized as a set of universal, unintentional psychological states.[3] They are mediated by culturally variable display rules and made visible on the body of the actor expressing the emotion. The primary site where emotions are lodged is the interior psychological life of the individual actor, an interior that includes specific forms of muscle control (producing specific displays on the face) inherited from our primate ancestors. The environment around the actor is given no systematic analysis (except for variation in display rules among cultures). Indeed, it is argued that a defining characteristic of emotions, which differentiates them from

other forms of expression, is that facial expressions as such do not reveal a seeable referent in the environment: "The angry expression does not reveal who is the target, nor can one know from the expression itself what brought forth the anger" (Ekman, comment, in Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 84).[4]

Though it is recognized that both sound and the face can display emotion, in practice almost all research has focused on the face. In research flowing from Ekman the face has been examined in two complementary ways: (a) through rigorous description of the muscles used to produce the specific facial displays that express emotion (a perspective in Darwin's original work that had its predecessor in the extraordinary use of photos by Duchenne of faces with different muscles stimulated by electricity); and (b) by asking members of different cultures to judge what emotion is shown by specific configurations of muscles on the face.

Despite the genuine rigor of this research, and the substantive findings it has produced, the perspective on emotion it adopts has an enormous lacuna. The investigative focus of research never moves beyond the face and underlying muscles of a single actor. In practice, a single face is examined in isolation from (a) the bodies of other actors; (b) other co-occurring sign phenomena such as prosodically indexed talk; and (c) the unfolding flow of action in interaction. However, there is no doubt that the scope of an emotion is *not* restricted to the individual who displays it. By virtue of their systematic expression on the face (and elsewhere, such as in prosody) emotions constitute public forms of action. Indeed, this is explicitly recognized by Ekman (afterword, in Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 373). However, Ekman argues that study of how emotional displays function as signals shifts focus away from study of the emotion itself (Ekman, afterword, in Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 372). For Ekman, its special status as involuntary rather than intentional action constitutes it as something that can be trusted in a special way: "We don't make an emotional expression to send a deliberate message, although a message is received" (Ekman, afterword, in Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 373).

The way in which a phenomenon is delimited at the beginning of a research enterprise creates an analytic geography with some phenomena being constituted as focal (the face, its muscles, and the interior psychological states thus expressed), while others are rendered invisible and beyond the pale of what should be studied (the interactive context, the social organization of emotional displays, other parts of the body.) There are also methodological advantages to constituting the field of study in this way. High-resolution photographs can easily be obtained of posed facial expressions, without having to be concerned with how to record spontaneous behavior unobtrusively, how much to record, and so on (Ekman, 2006, p. 189). Such theoretical and methodological choices have enormous consequences.

Imposing such a geography on the study of emotion is a choice. When Ekman proposed this form of research to Gregory Bateson, Bateson told him that he was being misled. According to Bateson:

> Use of the word expression directed attention away from the role of facial movements as communicative signals. It was a mistake to consider expression as tied to internal

> sensations and physiological activity; *they were tied to the back-and-forth flow of conversation*. (Ekman, afterword, in Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 372, our emphasis added)

We agree with Bateson.

Emotion as Interactively Organized Stance

We will use the sequence in Figure 1 to investigate how emotion might be organized within the flow of ongoing interaction as a contextualized, multiparty, multimodal process. Four girls, who all attend the same "progressive" school, are eating lunch together at a table on the school grounds. Angela, sitting alone on the left is a scholarship student who has been excluded from the popular girls' in-group, despite her repetitive efforts for acceptance.[5] Indeed, her marginalization is to some extent visible in the way in which she is seated alone on one side of the table, while the other three girls form a tight inclusive group as they sit across from her. At the beginning of the sequence Angela, who is much poorer than the other girls, starts to eat her lunch without utensils. Lisa asks her to leave and go to another table (lines 1–3). Instead Angela turns away so that her face is not visible to the others. In line 10 Aretha describes what Angela is doing as "disgusting." As this word comes to completion Angela moves her body back so that she is again facing the girls across from her, and starts to eat by dipping her



Figure 1



Figure 1 (*continued*)

tongue into the chocolate pudding container. When this happens the other three girls turn their heads and upper bodies away from her while producing high-pitched screams. These embodied displays escalate (see Figure 1, Image E), and in line 20 Lisa, responding to what she has just seen, says that she needs "to go to the bathroom."[6]

Emotion as Multiparty, Multimodal Stance.

Disgust as a Universal Emotion

One of the reasons that we have chosen the sequence in Figure 1 is that Ekman lists *disgust*, the term used by Aretha in line 10 to categorize her reaction to what Angela is doing, as one of the five distinct emotions universally agreed to be central to the human repertoire of emotions (Ekman, introduction, in Darwin, 1872/1998, p. xxx). Disgust has a central place in the analysis of both Darwin and the Ekman tradition. Indeed, what happens here is in strong agreement with Darwin's description of disgust. For Darwin "disgust . . . refers to something revolting, primarily in relation to the sense of taste, as actually perceived or vividly imagined" (Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 250). He notes that disgust is frequently accompanied by "gutteral sounds . . . written as *ach* or *ugh*;" and their utterance is sometimes accompanied by a shudder (see Figure 1, lines 13 and 14 and Image F), and is often accompanied "by gestures as if to push away or guard against the offensive object" (Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 256; see Figure 1, Images C and E). Darwin argues that the embodied actions used to express disgust are closely tied to processes such as vomiting, in which something treated as disgusting is forcibly expelled from the body. In line 20, after seeing how Angela eats, Lisa says "I need to go to the bathroom."

Moreover, for Darwin, *disgust* has very close ties to *scorn*, *disdain*, and *contempt*, in that "they all consist of actions representing the rejection or exclusion of some real object which we dislike or abhor" (Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 260). Through their displays of disgust that target Angela, the girls on the right side of the table are treating her as just such an abhorred object, and indeed the displays constitute a means of degrading her. For Darwin disgust can locate objects in the world, such as revolting food, and also constitute a social display that demeans other actors. Both of these processes are intertwined here.

Disgust Locates a Target

We are very impressed with how Darwin's observations, written almost a century and a half ago without any close examination of actual unfolding interaction, accurately draw attention to a number of relevant phenomena in Figure 1. However, the nature of Darwin's analysis renders problematic Ekman's definition of emotions as expressions that do not locate a target in the environment beyond the individual. For Ekman emotional displays have a special status and can be trusted precisely because they are "involuntary not intentional" (Ekman, afterword, in Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 372). Emotions "inform us that something important is happening inside the person who shows the emotion" (Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 372). Unlike phenomena such as hatred, envy and jealousy, emotions do "not reveal who is the target, nor can one know from the expression itself what brought forth the anger." (Ekman, comment, in Darwin, 1872/1998, pp. 83–4). By way of contrast Darwin continuously describes disgust as a response to something the person (or other animal) is encountering in the environment (revolting food, people to be abhorred, etc.). In Figure 1 a

range of phenomena locate Angela quite explicitly as the target of the other girls' expressive behavior. These include both what they say (note the deictic "that's" that immediately precedes "disgusting" in line 10), and how they rapidly reorganize their bodies so as to avoid having to look at Angela. From a phenomenological perspective both the displays described by Darwin and what the girls do locate relevant intentional objects.

What difference does this make? If phenomena beyond an isolated actor's face are in fact relevant to the organization of expressions of disgust, and other emotions, analysis must take this expanded geography into account[7]. Using as primary stimuli static photographs of faces with different expressions renders phenomena in the actor's environment, such as relevant targets of the emotional expression, both invisible and irrelevant. This expanded perspective seems quite consistent with Darwin's original formulation of the issue. As already noted he typically describes not only the expression, but also what the expression is responding to. For example, the caption for a picture of a cat invoking a vivid display states "Cat terrified at a dog" (Darwin, 1872/1998, p. 127). The primary place where environmental response cannot be taken into account is Darwin's use of Duchenne's photographs of faces where electrical current was used to stimulate different muscles. These photographs are among the most striking produced in the entire nineteenth century. They should not, however, be used as methodological guidelines to delimit the parameters for subsequent research into emotion. In brief, we are proposing that emotional expressions be investigated within an environment of unfolding action being constituted in part through orientation to the bodies and actions of others.

Describing Interacting Bodies

Figure 1 and most of the later Figures in this chapter vividly illustrate the highly diverse ways that participants can use their bodies to take up stances, including emotional ones, toward other participants, proposed courses of action, and phenomena in their surround. How can such interacting bodies be transcribed in a way that is analytically relevant? Is it possible to accurately, indeed exhaustively, describe the configuration of a human body (Birdwhistell, 1970)? Thus in Figure 1 one can say that Angela turns around to her left in Image B and then back to her right in images D and E, or that front right girl in Image E moves her torso to her left while the rear girl moves her torso to her right. While accurate, such statements provide no relevant description of how these bodies are displaying affective stance.

To capture the variety of subtle ways that bodies in local circumstances are deployed to accomplish relevant action we are using line drawings, rather than linguistic descriptions. However, central to the phenomena being investigated in this chapter is how the body is used to display a stance toward someone else and a proposed course of action. To note this in the transcript we are annotating the images with simple symbols marking alternative alignments toward what others have just

done, or are doing. A double-headed arrow ◄——► marks a *congruent alignment*. Thus in Image C Lisa has asked Angela to go somewhere else because of the way she is eating (lines 1–3). Angela doesn't leave the table, but does turn her body away so that her eating is not visible to others (and this, rather than simply moving her body to the left, is what is relevant as a form of embodied action). Over line 8 Lisa waves her hand toward Angela with a dismissive gesture (note Darwin's comments above about gestures showing disdain and contempt). Both Lisa's gesture and her talk openly insult Angela. However, by reorganizing her body to hide the activity the others find offensive, Angela is displaying a congruent alignment to the proposals made by Lisa, and thus participating in her own degradation. The configuration constituted through the mutual orientation of Lisa and Angela's bodies is thus annotated with a double arrow.

We use a horizontal arrow with a vertical line at the end toward the other ——| to mark an *oppositional alignment*. Thus in Image E Angela brings her face back into the gaze of Lisa and her friends, and shortly after this all three girls dramatically turn their faces and upper bodies away from Angela. These actions are thus annotated with oppositional arrows. We stress that these configurations are being defined not in terms of the behavior of a single isolated body, but instead with reference to how one actor's body aligns with others' bodies and proposed courses of action. Though the girls at each end of the bench turn their bodies in opposite directions, they are performing the same action with reference to the changes just made by Angela's body.

Prosody

While both Darwin and Ekman note that emotion can be displayed vocally, in practice most analysis in this tradition has focused on the face. However, prosody[8] is both pervasive and absolutely central to the organization of affective stance. Consider lines 12–13 in Figure 1. On seeing Angela eat with her tongue Aretha self-interrupts the talk in progress in line 11 (marked with a dash in *again-*), turns rapidly away from Angela while making a face and closing her eyes, and produces a cry with high sustained pitch. Note the Praat pitchtrack over the transcribed talk. Janis quickly joins her own voice to this cry.

The prosody that occurs here provides powerful resources for displaying affective stance. A number of its features will be noted. First, rather than simply expressing a single individual's internal state, it places something new in the public environment that is constituting the point of departure for the organization of the actions of the moment. Some evidence for the importance of the public organization of this display can be found in the way that Janis, in line 13, rapidly joins Aretha's cry. Rather than having an individual emotion, participants are situated within an environment structured in part by the public presence of hearable emotion.

Second, these prosodic displays are produced over talk that constitutes a form of emotive interjection or the response cry (Goffman, 1978) "*Ew::::.*" However, the

prosody that occurs here in fact produces a more powerful and vivid display of affective stance than the production of the *emotion* word "disgusting" in line 10. Third, the display gets both its power and its intelligibility from its sequential placement, the way in which it is visibly organized as a sudden next move to what Angela has done (eating with her tongue). In this it is like the embodied alignments noted above. It requires an analytic framework that extends beyond the voice of the actor producing the prosody to encompass the target being responded to and operated on. It is an interactive, dialogic action rather than the expression of something internal to a single individual.

Fourth, unlike lexical items that can be abstracted from the stream of speech and transported to other settings and media, such as the transcript written here, prosody, like facial expression, is intimately tied to a particular actor's body performing consequential action at a specific moment. A person hearing it is thrust into the lived presence of another human being who is in the midst of experiencing something while taking up a powerful, embodied stance toward the phenomena that generated that experience.

Fifth, affective prosody can co-occur with other embodied phenomena. Here the turn-away and the prosody in lines 12–13 occur together as part of a larger ensemble of action. In light of this it might be argued that instead of focusing separately on the face, embodied movements, and prosody, one should analyze the entire action holistically. However, as they mutually elaborate each other, each of these modalities makes distinct and different contributions to the ensemble of emotion and stance that occurs here. Moreover, where relevant, participants can disassemble such structures, to build new forms of action through progressive transformation of distinct elements of a prior ensemble (C. Goodwin, 2011).

From a slightly different perspective the public organization of prosody provides the resources for socially complex alignment displays. When Janis joins Aretha in line 13, an individual display of affective stance is transformed into a shared, multiparty display of stance toward, and disgust with, Angela. One finds a situation of two against one, which is transformed into three against one a moment later when Lisa also turns away. Such coalitions in which within-group solidarity is cemented by shared opposition toward, and/or exclusion of, someone constituted as an outsider is central to not only human, but also primate organization in general. In the diagram to the right of Image E we have tried to indicate this graphically by combining lines of oppositional stance toward Angela with arrows of congruent alignment tying the three girls on the right together into a common framework of stance, opposition, experience, and emotion toward Angela. Prosody makes possible not only the display of experience, emotion, and stance, but provides the resources for constructing and organizing shared experience. Insofar as this is the case, it becomes a major locus for the constitution of embodied habitus (Bourdieu, 1977) within a dialogic framework (Linell, 2009), as separate individuals participate together in common verbal, prosodic, and embodied courses of action in ways that enable them to constitute shared affective stance toward relevant objects in their lifeworld. Some

evidence for the *in situ* socializing power of these interactive environments for the constitution of affective stance and experience can be seen in the way in which Janis, the girl in the middle, starts to produce her embodied displays only after seeing what Aretha is doing.

Prosody will be extremely important in the examples in the rest of this chapter. The use of prosody frequently leads to particular kinds of phonetic selection. Sounds that can be produced with extended duration, such as vowels and nasals, but not stops, make extended prosodic displays possible. In the Jefferson transcription system such lengthening is marked with colons. Because this is so central to the phenomena that will be examined in this chapter we have decided to highlight such lengthening with gray boxes with wavy lines, such as are found in line 12. These boxes include not only lengthened sounds indicated with colons but also adjacent vowels and nasals (including a word such as "No"). This is a purely notational device that helps us to organize our transcripts to make relevant phenomena stand out as clearly as possible to the reader.

Summary

The interaction visible in Figure 1 provides materials for proposing a framework for the investigation of affective stance that conceptualizes such phenomena as dialogic and embedded within ongoing interaction within the lived social world. We have great respect for the work done by Ekman and his colleagues. The video materials we are using do not permit the close analysis of the face and its muscles that are central to his work. We are therefore very much in favor of the presence of diverse research traditions that can provide complementary analysis of important and complex phenomena such as emotion.

As part of a dialogue with other work on emotion we would like to note some distinctive ways that emotion emerges in unfolding interaction documented in our materials. First, rather than having its primary locus in the individual, it is dialogic both in the way in which it takes up a stance toward something beyond the individual, and in how it is organized within frameworks of temporally unfolding interaction. In constructing stance and emotion, participants perform operations on the displays, signs, and embodied materials produced by their coparticipants. Emotions arise in part from the world being encountered by local actors, and help to further shape both that world and the actions of others. Second, the use of interactive materials adds a strong temporal and sequential dimension to the study of emotion. The structured unfolding of interaction helps us to systematically investigate the rapid flow of emotion and the way in which mutable emotions are in a constant process of flux, something that has long been noted by poets such as Shakespeare and philosophers such as James and the phenomenologists. Third, a variety of different kinds of phenomena, such as facial expressions, prosody, embodied stances, and movements (for example, the girls turning away from Angela), are implicated simultaneously in the construction of specific displays of stance and emotion. The way in which action is built through the use of diverse materials that mutually elaborate each other

(C. Goodwin, 2000, 2011) enables actors to precisely adapt to local interactive environments by constructing a range of variable displays. This in fact seems consistent with Darwin's own interests in species as populations, rather than fixed types, with variability providing the resources necessary for both adaptation and change.

The approach to the study of emotion we are suggesting here requires particular kinds of materials. Most centrally we view emotions as dialogic phenomena, and this is certainly true for stance as well (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987). Therefore, rather than focusing on the individual in isolation, we want to look at sequences in which one party is responding to, or in some other way performing operations on, actions produced by another. In the remainder of this chapter we will use as data sequences of family interaction recorded in the United States and Sweden in which one party, a child, is responding to a directive produced by another, a parent. Such interactively structured sequences provide environments where the dialogic organization of emotion can be systematically investigated.

CONTEXTUAL CONFIGURATIONS OF STANCE DISPLAY IN DIRECTIVE SEQUENCES

In the midst of mundane activities, as family members take up various types of stances toward the actions in progress, they constitute themselves as particular kinds of social and moral actors (C. Goodwin, 2007). We examine the embodied practices that children make use of in response to directives: in particular, we are concerned with three basic types of next moves: bald refusals, moves that put off or avoid immediate compliance with parental directives, and compliance.

Directives constitute a form of *situated activity system*: "a somewhat closed, self-compensating, self-terminating circuit of interdependent actions" (Goffman, 1961, p. 96). As such, rather than being restricted to the verbal channel, frequently the focus of studies on directives, they require attention to next actions of participants, which entail fully embodied forms of participation (Cekaite, 2010; C. Goodwin, 2007; Goodwin & Goodwin, 2004; M. H. Goodwin, 2006a) in addition to talk. Kendon (2009, p. 363) argues, "Every single utterance using speech employs, in a completely integrated fashion, patterns of voicing and intonation, pausings and rhythmicities, which are manifested not only audibly, but kinesically as well." Indeed Bolinger (1989, p. 1) early described intonation as "part of a gestural complex" (one that includes the body as well as the face) for signaling attitudes. Both the way that talk and the body mutually elaborate each other and the ways that operations are performed vis-à-vis the other are part of the processes of mutual elaboration through which actions we studied are built.

Ervin-Tripp and Gordon (1984), in an early study of directives, were concerned with children's developmental acquisition of uses of verbal mitigation (through overt marking, justifying and allusion or hinting) to display deference to the addressee. Craven and Potter (2010) examine practices of moving from modal interrogative requests (ones showing concern with the hearer's willingness to comply, or "contingency") to upgraded parental directives displaying increasingly heightened

speaker "entitlement" (Curl & Drew, 2008; Heinemann, 2006; Lindström, 2005) to control the recipient's actions. By way of contrast our interest is in the agency demonstrated in children's *responses* to directives, responses systematically shaped as affective stances toward the proposed course of action. As research exploring parent–child directive sequences that develop over time (a day, or a week) has demonstrated, children can exert a considerable degree of agency when formulating, revising or redefining parental terms for requested action (Aronsson & Cekaite, 2011).

Just as directives can take more "mitigated" or "aggravated" forms (Labov & Fanshel, 1977), so responses to directives can be formulated with various degrees of politeness or "impoliteness" (Bousfield, 2008; Mills, 2010). While Labov and Fanshel (1977, pp. 87–8) state that an unaccounted refusal can lead to a break in social relations, in the context of family interaction, as Blum-Kulka (1997, p. 150) has argued, "unmodified directness is neutral or unmarked in regard to politeness." In our data children's bald refusals constitute one possible response to directives. Alternatively, putting off a directive may be accomplished through actions such as ignoring the directive or pleading objections, which can lead to modifying or postponing the directive.

Ervin-Tripp, O'Connor, and Rosenberg (1984, p. 118) argue that speakers with high esteem have the right to receive verbal deference from others and can make control moves baldly, without offering deference to those who are lower in esteem. We find that through pleading objections children construct the parent as someone who is esteemed, but who nonetheless has obligations to attend to aspects of the children's emotional life. By way of contrast, children's bald refusals construct open confrontations and can lead to character contests (Goffman, 1967, pp. 237–8) in which parents and children negotiate relative positions of power (with children sometimes winning). Thus through their uptake to a directive children display a range of different perspectives, not only with regard to notions of obligation, but to notions of deference and demeanor as well. Across the data to be examined we find very different types of social order (Goffman, 1963, p. 8) developing from these alternative trajectories of action. Quite distinctive forms of ethos (Bateson, 1972) evolve as families overlay their activities with different forms of affect (M. H. Goodwin, 2006a, p. 516).

Data

The examples in this study are drawn from video recordings of naturally occurring interaction in families who were part of UCLA's Center on Everyday Lives of Families (CELF) and Sweden's sister project (SCELF). Approximately fifty hours of interaction were collected in thirty-two families over a week's time in the US and approximately thirty-seven hours for eight families in Sweden. Video-ethnographic methodology made it possible to record mundane talk (C. Goodwin, 1981), physical gestures (Streeck, 2009) and action (C. Goodwin, 2000), and routine activities (Tulbert & Goodwin,

2011), all within the household settings where people actually carry out their daily lives (Ochs, Graesch, Mittmann, & Bradbury, 2006). The age range of children recorded was one through eighteen, although in this chapter we deal primarily with children ages four through ten.

EMBODIED AFFECTIVE REFUSALS TO DIRECTIVES

Rather than delaying disagreement or a preference for agreement through hedges or pauses (Pomerantz, 1978), in the American data negation words often occur at the earliest possible place in response to (recycled) directives, at the beginnings of next moves to directives. In refusals ("No!") the most dramatic way in which opposition is expressed prosodically is through dramatic pitch leaps with rise–fall contours. Such defiant opposition turns exhibit acoustic features of emphatic speech style identified by Selting (1994, p. 375; 1996, p. 237): duration (the acoustic correlate of length)[9] or extended vowels and heightened fundamental frequency (the acoustic correlate of perceived pitch). Consider the following:

While children are watching television with Dad, Dad gives three directives to Jason (age four) to initiate actions to brush his teeth: "Here" ((extending toothbrush to Jason)), "Come on." and "Okay we gotta go" and Jason gives no response. Dad, himself, meanwhile, has remained on the couch avidly attending the television. When Dad gets up from the couch and delivers a fourth directive (line 1) Jason buries himself in the sofa. While speaking "We gotta go." Dad drags Jason from the couch toward the bathroom.

1 Dad: **So**rry guys. (1.6) **Time** to turn it off.

2 Jason: **N O:::** I'M **NOT-**

3 Dad: We gotta **go**. I **told** you Jason.
4 A few **min**utes.
. . .
5 Dad: Hailey g- go get the pair of shoes
6 you wanna wear. Also.
7 Dad: Let's **go**. We've gotta **go**.
8 Jason, do you want a piece of gum?

Figure 2

Three times Dad tells Jonah (age eight) to start getting ready for bed, and Jonah remains immobile, taking up a defiant stance with arms akimbo (line 3). Subsequently Jonah moves away from his father by going to the back door and begins looking out the back door. Father next gets up and moves to the back door and began massaging Jonah's shoulders (line 7)

1 Dad: **Go**- get a **book**.
2 For yours-
3 Jonah: **Ne**ver. *((defiant stance arms akimbo))*
4 Dad: How long is **ne**ver.

10 Seconds Later

5 Dad: **Lis**ten. You need to be in bed in twenty minutes.



6 Jonah: **N O** : : !

7 Dad: If you're **not** in bed in twenty minutes
8 I will hunt down wherever your **game**boy is
9 And get it. (.) *h And it's be gone for the **week**.
10 So **hu**rry your harness.=okay?
11 Go brush your **teeth**.

massaging Jonah's shoulders

Figure 3

In response to Mom's refusal to let Emil (age five) brush his teeth on the couch Emil turns away from his Mom and begins dramatically flailing his arms in the air while crying out:

1 Mom: **Kom** nu höre du.
Come on you.

2 Emil: Ma::a:h. Får man borsta tänderna härinne?
Ma::ah. Can I brush my teeth in here?
((gestures protesting))

3 Mom: Ne:j. Det **får** du faktiskt inte.
No:. You can't actually.



4 Emil: NE: U:::H m:::h



Figure 4

These defiant opposition turns exhibit acoustic features of emphatic speech style identified by Selting: (a) extended vowels (the acoustic correlate of length); and (b) heightened fundamental frequency (the acoustic correlate of perceived pitch):

	Vowel duration	Pitch height
Figure 2	580 msec.	750 Hz
Figure 3	860 msec.	612 Hz
Figure 4	673 msec.	663 Hz

In Figures 2–4 children protest over multiple turns the directives that are posed to them, and parents respond with upgraded responses: bribes (Figure 2) and threats (Figures 3–4). In Figure 2 Jason had to be bribed with gum (line 8) to dislodge him from the sofa where he hid his head to avoid going to the bathroom. Jonah in Figure 3 was threatened that he would have his Game Boy taken away (lines 8–9).

Rather than using threats or bribes, another possible parental response to a refusal is a metacommentary about the child's conduct. In Figure 5 below, in response to eight-year-old Alison's refusal to take a bath because she had done so yesterday, Mom responded: "It's not negotiable." (line 8).

Figures 2–4 show ways that children take up stances of defiance to their parent's directive. Both duration of the vowel (well exceeding 200 msec.) as well as the pitch height (above the 250 Hz normal pitch range for children) signal strong opposition. By way of contrast in Figure 5 the opposition that Alison produced was a softly produced, low-pitched "Uh uh" (going up only to 200 Hz, line 5). Her only bodily movement was a slight headshake. In response to Mom's ruling, Alison maintained a sullen face, and looked away from her mom, but she did not protest further. Mom closed down the sequence with her "It's not negotiable." Here disagreement was expressed silently, merely through the way Alison glanced away from her mother. When Mother declared that the act in

1 Mom: **Al**right. (4.0) It's twenty minutes to eight
2 Even though it doesn't **feel** like it.
3 Alison: **That** says **se**ven. *((pointing to the clock))*
4 Mom: We **have** to get you in the bath.

5 Alison: **Uh** uh. *((shakes head))*
6 I had a bath **yes**terday.
7 (0.8)
8 Mom: It's **not** negotiable. *((shakes head))*
9 (0.8)
10 Mom: Okay?
11 Alison: *((looks at mom, then turns head*
12 *away))*

Figure 5

question was nonnegotiable, that ended the matter (line 10). When the family finished eating, Alison complied with her mom's directive and took a bath.

The examples presented in this section demonstrate a range of ways in which children use embodied language practices to take up oppositional stances toward parental directives. Different types of action trajectories can develop, depending on types of accounts, volume, intonation, and embodied actions used by coparticipants. Parents may bodily assist children in complying with a directive through shepherding (Cekaite, 2010), scooping them up in their arms (Figure 7), or even dragging them (Figure 2) toward the targeted location.

EMBODIED AFFECTIVE STANCES USED IN PUTTING OFF DIRECTIVES

In our data on directives in family life, we also find children's responses that put off the directives: in contrast to the dramatic moves of noncompliance (Figures 2–6), children can make appeals to take their position into account and ask to modify or postpone the directive. Pleading turns occur as responses to directives that clearly prescribe a specific course of action, expecting compliance, as in "Luke. Bath. (0.2) Come on."(Figure 6) or "I:ngella? You come here, because we've got to go to bed now." (Figure 8, below) or "Turn it off." (Figure 8) Grammatical forms used for these directives entail a range of resources: imperatives "Turn it off" (Figure 8) and "Come on" (Figure 6), second person declaratives (in Swedish used for indexing upgraded directives as in Figure 7), and noun phrases (Figure 6), that, together with prosody, provide for an unmitigated way of upgrading directives.

Verbal features of responses to such directive forms involve a range of resources, such as politeness terms ("please," address terms of endearment), and accounts

(often prefaced by the sequential conjunction *but*) that argue that an action cannot be performed because it violates the child's personal desires. Putting off directive turns exhibit distinct prosodic contours, characterized by a high global pitch, rising–falling elongated glides on lengthened vowels as well as marked aspiration. Such features Günthner (1997b, p. 253), in her analysis of the contextualization of affect in reported speech in German, describes as a "plaintive tone of voice."

In Figure 6, eight-year-old Luke's pleading cries provide something other than an outright refusal. Covering himself up with a blanket on the sofa (see image below) Luke instead puts off the requested action (his mother's summons to take a bath), by stating "NO:: Not ye:::t!" (line 2) and "after piano" (lines 5, 12), and provides explanations for his lack of uptake through accounts such as "But I'm tired and I wanna go to slee-." (line 26). Throughout lines 1–17 he was curled up on the couch, hiding under a cover.



Figure 6

13 Mom: Nope.



14 Luke: **Wh y::::::::::::.**

15 Mom: **N OW::.**

16 Luke: **Pl ea:::::se.**

17 Mom: By the time Marty- *((pulling blanket off Luke))*
18 By [the time you're
19 Luke: [No.

20 Mom: No. By the time Marty's done
21 It's going to be ten thirty. [Come on.
22 Luke: [**No:::::::.**
23 Luke: **PLE A:::::SE.**
24 Mom: No. I'm counting to
25 Mom: three right now.

26 Luke: But I'm tired and I wanna go to **slee-**
27 Mom: And you're
28 And **you're** going to be even more tired.
29 Come on.=ONE, [TWO,
30 Luke: [**PLE A:::SE.**
31 **Please.**
32 Mom: NO! COME!
33 Luke: But I'm **t i::red!**

Figure 6 (*continued*)

As Mom finishes eating dinner with other family members in the dining room, she initiates a directive to Luke (in the living room) to take a bath. Over numerous moves putting off the directive, Luke provides a series of dramatic rise–fall contours (lines 12, 14, 16, 26) with elongated vowels (some 1130 msec.) on the final falling syllables of utterances (lines 7, 8, 12, 14, 16, 22, 23, 26). Mom in this sequence insists that Luke comply, over seventy-five consecutive turns at talk, providing (continual) rationales for the directive (See M. H. Goodwin, 2006a, pp. 534–5, for a more complete analysis of this sequence). Providing a gloss of Luke's actions she states calmly, "I don't want to hear any more complaints please." Eventually, after a series of repeated directives from Mom and refusals and excuses from Luke, he walks to the bathroom to take a bath.

Utterances such as those in Figure 6 might be interpreted as forms of "appeals,"[10] described by Schieffelin (1990, p. 112) for Kaluli society as modalities of action strategically used to attempt to make others "feel sorry for" the speaker. The recipient of an appeal responds with compassion or assistance to the participant making the appeal, who is viewed as being helpless. In our data, pleading turns are used in second pair part accounts for noncompliance with a directive, implicitly casting the parent as someone who has obligations to take the child's feelings and position into account. The child's affective stance toward the requested action can be indexed through (turn-initial) response cries "E::H, AJ, UU:H" (signaling feelings of strong displeasure and indignation), crying sounds, sobbing that, in addition to the "pleading contour," signals the affective quality and intensity of objection.

In Figure 7 Mom demands that her five-year-old daughter, Ingella, who is in another room, go to bed right away in response to Mom's directive (line 1), Ingella, in a plaintive voice, directs her pleading appeal to Mom, with a turn-initial conjunction objecting to the prior turn (line 2). Mom, however, mockingly redirects the appeal to the daughter, employing herself a stylized pleading intonation contour. The daughter then upgrades her pleading with an account that features a strong display of sadness, namely, sobbing (lines 4–5). It is in response to this upgraded affective stance that Mom displays her coalignment with the daughter's position, and Ingella finally complies (approaching Mom).

Pleading objection turns exhibit distinctive acoustic features: duration/extended vowels, heightened fundamental frequency, and falling intonation on elongated final vowels (e.g. Günthner, 1997b, p. 253). Below are the durations and pitch heights of the vowels in selected sequences (including Figure 8):

	Vowel duration	Pitch height
Figure 6, line 2	560 msec.	350→300 Hz
Figure 6, line 12	529 msec.	410→300 Hz
Figure 7, line 2	530 msec.	400→200 Hz
Figure 8, line 9	380 msec.	400→200 Hz
Figure 8, line 11	558 msec.	480→200 Hz

1 Mom: I:NGELLA? NU **KO**MMER DU, FÖR NU SKA VI **SO**VA.
I:NGELLA? YOU COME HERE, BECAUSE WE'VE GOT TO GO TO BED NOW.



2 Ingella: Me- **ma::**mm=
But mo: : m=

3 Mom: =Men **I::::**ngella.
=But I::::ngella.

4 Ingella: Huhh jag vill **so**(hhh)va
Huhh I want to slee(hhh)p

5 där(hh)inn(hh)e, huhh huhh
the(hh)re, huhh huhh

6 Mom: Jamen vi **ko**llar härinne.
We'll look in here.
((points at children's bedroom))

7 Ingella: Jag ( ) inte. Jag är **trött**, heh heh
I ( ) not. I'm tired, heh heh
((runs to mom))

8 *((Ingella jumps up, mother scoops her in her arms))*

9 Mom: Finns inte (.) nån plats hår.
Is there (.) any space here.
((carries daughter to the bedroom))

Figure 7

In our data, we find that the entire body is deployed to organize embodied stances toward the actions of others: such stances portray the children as being "unhappy," "helpless," or "tired," or otherwise unable to accomplish the request. In the following Figure 8, Mom tells her two daughters, Alma (eight years) and Saga (six years) to turn off the television and come to eat breakfast. Instead of complying with Mom's directive, the girls attempt to redefine the terms of the target action. In addition to prosody, the entire body, face, torso, and limbs, index a display of "unhappiness" (lines 9, 11). There is a sad, desperate look on Alma's face. She also leans back, stretching out both her head (turned a bit to the left) and her arms, arranging her body similarly to an iconic display of the Virgin Mary. Saga with her gesture covers her face.

1 Mom: **Tje**jer? Ni får stänga **a**v nu, och komma
Girls? You've got to turn off now, and come

2 och äta frukost.
and have breakfast.

3 (0.2)

4 Mom: Hör ni vad jag **sa**?
Did you hear what I said?

5 Alma: Men jag vill-
But I want-

6 (0.5)

7 Alma: Kan vi inte få äta **fru**kost häruppe?
Can't we have breakfast upstairs?

8 Mom: Nej. Stäng av.
No. Turn it off.



9 Alma: Snä::lla mamma:::

Kind mom
'Please mom'

10 Mom: Men ni har redan tittat nu. Stäng **av**.
But you've watched it now. Turn it off.

Figure 8



11 Alma: Jag vill faktiskt verkligen **se:** på det hä::r.
I want actually really see this.
'I actually really want to see this.'

12 Det är faktiskt andra **gå**:ngen.
It's the second time actually.

Figure 8 (*continued*)

When later, shown in Figure 9, Mom demands compliance by finally turning of the television herself, the girls' embodied responses—Alma's gesture of exasperation and Saga's slapping the couch, while looking at Mom—display their exasperation and frustration with Mom's action (lines 21, 22).

Children's pleading turns elicit specific types of responses: Parents may refuse to put off the directive (ignoring the pleading response, recycling it, or accounting for the

20 Mom: ((comes upstairs and turns off the TV))

21 Alma: E::H

22 Saga: Ma m**ma**::
Mom



23 Mom: A men ni har redan **ti**ttat på massvis.
Yeah but you've already watched loads of this.

24 **Kom** nu.
Come on now. *((follows girls downstairs))*

Figure 9

directive, Figures 6, 8, 9) or give in (modifying or postponing the initial directive, Figure 7). Affectively charged pleadings, harboring accounts for noncompliance, evoke parental rationales for directives and constitute a ground for the development of extended directive sequences.

EMBODIED TRAJECTORIES OF JOYFUL COMPLIANCE TO DIRECTIVES

While we have primarily been concerned with how directives are postponed or refused, alternative ways of responding are of course possible. Children do comply and can even enthusiastically spring into action following a directive.

In the examples below we find moves of joyful compliance. In Figure 10 at dinner the family had been discussing how eight-year-old Aurora might befriend a shy

1 Mom: **O**kay. **Time** to brush your teeth.
2 Aurora: **Time** to brush your tee(hh)th,
3 Wes: eh heh!
4 Aurora: **That** is not Bra**zil**ian.
5 Wes: Eh heh heh heh!
6 Wes: Eh heh-heh heh heh-heh!
7 Aurora: *((stands up from table))*
8 Mom: **Sam**ba. *((pointing to bathroom))*
9 Aurora: **Sam**::ba.
10 Mom: **Sam**ba to the bathroom.
11 Aurora: *((begins to dance samba to bathroom))*

Figure 10

Brazilian boy in her class by asking him about Brazilian samba; the conversation then shifted to a discussion of Brazilian Portuguese. When Mom states "Okay. Time to brush your teeth." Aurora, in a repair-like counter move (M. H. Goodwin, 1990b, p. 147), playfully challenging the directive, responds: "Time to brush your tee(hh)th, That is not Brazilian" (lines 2 and 4).

Rather than dealing with the pragmatic or referential meaning of the utterance, Aurora instead playfully challenges its form (line 4). Wes (aged five), Aurora's brother, displaying that he is joining in the humorous interpretation of Mom's talk, overlaps Aurora's talk with laughter (lines 5–6). As Aurora gets up from the table, and stands in a position indicating her willingness to carry out what has been asked of her, Mom (lines 8–10) then provides a directive that enters into the frame of play Aurora had initiated (lines 2 and 4), as she states, "Samba. Samba to the bathroom." Across a number of types of interactions these family members engage in wordplay and joyful exploration of their phenomenal world (M. H. Goodwin, 2007).

In Swedish families, we find similar directive trajectories keyed as playful endeavors. In figure 11 Mom's directives to go and clean the room before watching the TV show are designed as playfully embodied instructions. Mom helps her ten-year-old

1 Mom: A men du. (.) går du upp och så **plo**ckar
Well but you. (.) go upstairs and then clean

2 lite pä ditt **rumm**? Städa alla saker pä
your room a bit? Clean all things from

3 **bor**det. (0.3) Ska du göra det?
the table. (0.3) You'll do that?
((turning the daughter around))

4 Marie: Ja.
Yes.

5 Mom: Sen kan du komma och **se** det.
Then you can come back and watch it.
((refers to TV show))

Figure 11

daughter pirouette, and Maria dancingly turns from the window toward the target activity-relevant location (i.e., the staircase that leads to the girl's room), while verbally confirming her compliance.

While most studies of directives in the family focus on the moves of parents, here we have investigated the ways in which children not only comply with but also resist actions proposed to them. In Figures 2–11 children display through their bodily behavior (e.g., arms akimbo) as well as their talk their stance toward the directive. Children can avoid entering any type of facing formation whatsoever vis-à-vis those who deliver the directive—hiding under a cover (Figures 6), burying their head in the couch (Figure 2), or turning away from parents (Figures 2, 5, 8, 9). Children can provide vivid portraits of the reluctant (Figures 6, 8–9) and defiant body (Figures 2–3) or, alternatively, assume a willing body, as, Aurora, and Maria (in Figures 10 and 11), displaying forms of cooperative semiosis (C. Goodwin, 2011). Figure 12 below demonstrates the pervasiveness of how the body is organized dialogically. A range of examples from two different societies all demonstrate how individuals organize their bodies with reference to the bodies of their cointeractants and the courses of actions they are pursuing together.

Discussing the special mutuality of immediate social interaction Park (1927, p. 738) argues that the individual in society lives "a more or less public existence in which all his acts are anticipated, checked, inhibited, or modified by the gestures and the intentions of his fellows." He argues that "it is this social conflict, in which the individual lives more or less in the mind of every other individual, that human nature and the individual may acquire their most characteristic and human traits."

Embodied stances exemplify such dialogic (Linell, 2009) public phenomena. While they are responsive to the prior action, simultaneously they are proactive: as a display of the speaker's alignment to another's action, they shape the hearer's



Figure 12

response, constraining what will come next. Children's confrontational refusals result in little accommodation to the child; parents often recycle directives, and mention sanctions for noncompliance. The pleading mode, by way of contrast, is calibrated to invoke a parent's alignment with the child's position. Such multimodally organized directive trajectories thus show clearly that emotion and stance are not simply add-ons to an isolated individual action, but constitute an inherent feature of temporally unfolding sequences of social interaction.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter we have tried to develop a perspective for the analysis of emotion that focuses on how it is organized as social practice within ongoing human interaction.

Much analysis of emotion investigates its primary organization as being lodged within the psychology of the individual. One strong tradition, taking as its point of departure Darwin (1872/1998), focuses on the evolution of particular emotions, and organization of the muscles used to display emotion in the face. Our framework proposes a quite different geography. From our perspective it is necessary to take into account not only the psychology and facial expressions of the individual expressing the emotion, but also the relevant actions and bodily displays of the parties they are interacting with. We argue specifically that the body of the party producing an

emotional display cannot be examined in isolation. Crucial to the organization of emotion as public practice is the way in which individuals display rapidly changing stances toward both other participants, and the actions currently in progress.

Methodologically it was therefore necessary to provide new ways of presenting relevant phenomena on the printed page: Because of the subtle way in which not just the face, but entire bodies are organized to display relevant stances, we found it appropriate to include images of bodies. The meaningfulness of bodily displays for indexing particular affective stances was constituted through how they were positioned within local activity frameworks, and vis-à-vis each other in the lived space of the habitual environments where interaction was occurring (i.e., homes with separate places for eating, watching television, and so on, and the tables on the playground). All of these phenomena were mobilized by interacting bodies in order to construct affective stance, and display locally relevant emotions.

Our focus on the analysis of emotion as situated interactive practice required particular kinds of data. Specifically, in order to examine how emotions were being mobilized with respect to the actions of others, we chose a particular sequential and multiparty environment. We focused our analysis on directives being given to children, and the responses made by these children, in both Sweden and the United States. All of these data demonstrate how emotion is organized as a multiparty phenomenon that mobilizes a range of different resources provided by both language and the body, including particular kinds of turn prefaces, and systematic use of prosody which showed similarities in the American and the Swedish data with respect to how bodies were mobilized to display either congruent alignment or opposition to the frameworks proposed by prior speakers. From our perspective both stance and emotion are not add-ons to action basically displayed through language structure. Instead they constitute central components of the situated actions participants build to carry out the mundane activities that make up the lived social worlds they inhabit together.

NOTES

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1. See also Jaffe (2009b) and Du Bois (2007) on stance.
2. Our focus on emotion as stance is, however, most relevant to the analysis emerging from neuroscience, of how emotions mark and inflect in a most consequential fashion

the events they are tied to (Damasio, 1999), which is relevant to phenomena such as the acquisition of complex skills, including becoming competent in a second language (Schumann et al., 2004).

3. In concert with work that views emotion as something that can be adequately described by restricting analysis to the individual, much work on emotion and language inspired by Wierzbicka (1995) has focused on her notion of semantic primitives. As Bamberg (1997, p. 210) defines it, "emotions to her are a semantic domain (1995, [p.] 235) to be investigated in a semantic metalanguage, i.e., in terms of indefinables or primitives (semantic universals) that are shared by all human languages." See Besnier (1990) and Wilce (2009) for reviews of language and emotion. See also Irvine (1982, 1990), Lutz and White (1986), Lutz and Abu-Lughod (1990), Matoesian (2005) Caffi and Janney (1994).
4. In 1998 Ekman prepared an edition of Darwin's original 1872 *The expression of the emotions in man and animals*, with his own introduction, afterword, and commentary. Thus many of the citations here that begin with Darwin's book are in fact quotes from Ekman. This is indicated in the in-text citation.
5. See M. H. Goodwin (2006b) for more extended analysis of the dynamics of this group and Angela's marginalization.
6. Talk is transcribed using a slightly modified version of the system developed by Gail Jefferson (see Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974, pp. 731–3). Talk receiving some form of emphasis (e.g., talk that would be underlined in a typewritten transcript using the Jefferson system) is marked with bold italics.
7. See also Fridlund's (1997) exposition of his "behavioral ecology view" of faces.
8. Reilly and Seibert (2003, p. 538) describe prosody as including "stress, intonation, loudness, pitch, juncture, and rate of speech. It is a suprasegmental feature in that prosody extends beyond the most basic linguistic unit, the phoneme."
9. The normal pitch range of preadolescent girls is between 250–350 Hz; any vowel longer than 200 milliseconds is considered extended (Yaeger-Dror, 2002; Richard Ogden, personal communication, 2010). Klatt (1976, p. 1209), writing about English, states that "the average (median) duration for a stressed vowel is about 130 msec. in a connected discourse." In Swedish the mean length of stressed vowels in connected discourse is 158 msec. and 103 msec. for short vowels (Elert, 1964).
10. Schieffelin (1990, p. 112) explains that she is using the term "appeal" to refer to a modality of action rather than a metalinguistic term in the Kaluli language.

CHAPTER 3

Distress in Adult–Child Interaction

ANTHONY J. WOOTTON

A focus of much research on children and emotion has been on how they and those who care for them talk about emotional states (for an overview see Carpendale & Lewis, 2006, pp. 214–20). Such talk can give clues as to how the child construes another person's mental life, a parameter of much interest to those investigating the child's "theory of mind": for example, the examination of talk between child and carer in which emotional states are topicalized can suggest discourse-based features which may contribute to the emergence of those cognitive parameters held to be germane to the child's understanding of emotion. Although there may be connections between such themes and what I shall have to say, connections that I will touch on later, my principal focus in this chapter is on the display of emotion rather than talk about it.

The display of emotion and talk about it are by no means coextensive. Long before children can predicate specific affects they can display them through a variety of linguistic and nonverbal techniques (Ochs, 1988, p. 185), and by the age of three there can be extensive communication of anger and aggression without any direct reference to emotional states (Miller & Sperry, 1988). There is a limited literature on the interactional dynamics of displays of emotion among young children. Some gives hints as to its distribution: for example, Dunn (1988, pp. 40, 194) argues that displays of anger and distress at eighteen to thirty-six months are associated with disputes over what she calls "rights," matters relating to the possession of things, sharing, taking turns, and fairness. But the emergence and shape of such disputes can take various forms, and their precise dynamics remain to be unraveled (though at older ages see Maynard, 1985; Goodwin & Goodwin, 2000). With regard to distress there is some suggestion that among young children breaches of expectation can be germane to distress onset. I'll give two examples of

this. Fogel (1993, pp. 164–5) discusses this in the context of distressed reactions to the unexpected withdrawal of the nipple during breastfeeding. He points out that this withdrawal gains its significance to the child because the system of interaction between the child and nipple/mother is one of coregulation, one in which actions of both parties are shaped with reference to the relevant state of the other, so that unexpected withdrawal is a breach of a delicately organized ongoing system (see also Kaye, 1982). Between the ages of twelve and twenty-four months a different kind of breach can come to be relevant. Here children, and parents, become increasingly interested in objects which are broken, dirty, or out of place, or with mishaps which bear on such matters. While distress can occur in such circumstances the more standard emotional reactions appear to be milder ones involving the display of tension or worry (Kagan, 1981, pp. 47–9; Dunn, 1988, pp. 22–5; Cole, Barrett, & Zahn-Waxler, 1992), while on some occasions humor can be involved. In parentheses I should add that such mishaps and other kinds of untoward event are disproportionately represented in recollections about the past between parents and young children (see, for example, Miller & Sperry, 1988). There are, therefore, important links between the occurrence of events involving heightened emotion and later talk about such events, thus complicating the contrast that I made in my opening paragraph.

Breaches of expectation have also come to figure in my own explorations of emotional displays during a child's third year of life. My data were derived from a series of longitudinal video recordings made at about two-month intervals during this period (for details see Wootton, 1997, pp. 21–3). My line of interest was sparked off by finding striking examples of distressed behavior in certain kinds of interaction sequence, specifically request sequences. In such sequences one place in which distress can occur is when the child's request is turned down, and an example of this will be discussed later, but an intriguing feature of the cases which initially attracted my attention was that in them the child's displeasure seemed to be incurred in the course of parental attempts to grant the request. In the first section below I'll examine two such sequences, so as to identify some of the practices which inform the occurrence of such distress. The second section will compare sequences like this with those request sequences in which the child's request is turned down, especially with regard to the form that the distress takes. The third section compares some of my findings with what is known of the distribution of distress among children with autism. And the fourth section will examine the implications of what I have said for current ways of conceptualizing emotion in research on young children, and for the kinds of developmental enquiry which would seem to be suggested by these findings. In all this I am treating "distress" as roughly denoting those forms of tearfulness which have crying as their most extreme form of expression (for useful delineation of these forms of expression see Hepburn (2004); I adopt her transcription suggestion of using the tilde (~) to convey "wobbly voice"). Something of this, or the events immediately leading up to it, is evident within all my transcripts, but the exponents vary, and one of my main arguments will be that this variability is systematic, and connected to properties of the sequence that contains the distressed behavior.

REQUESTS AND DISTRESS

The kind of distress on which I want to focus initially can be found in Extract 1 (see also Figures A–D related to Extract 1, below). Here the child, Amy, aged 2;5 (two years five months), is sitting on her mother's knee. At line 1 she makes it clear that she would like some honey, "I want- I wanta- Get me (a) honey." The gist of the mother's reply at lines 2–4, 6, 9, and 12–13 is that Amy needs to have her hands washed first, but the implication is that she can have some honey when this has happened. At line 10 Amy says "You get it for me, (.) Put it on the:re for me," shifting onto the manner in which the honey is to be made accessible to her rather than whether or not she is going to have the honey, and thus revealing her expectation that the honey is to be forthcoming.

Extract 1
Amy (aged 2;5) is sitting on her mother's knee, having her socks pulled on. They have just been talking about a picture on the nearby blackboard. This is the first mentioning of the honey in this sequence. Her father is sitting just out of camera shot to the right, reading a newspaper. M is mother and F is father (who is also the author of this article). Superscript letters correspond with the images.

01 A: I want- I wanta- Get me (a) honey.
02 M: Get you the honey?=Well if you're going to have some
03 honey you're going to have to (.) have your hands washed
04 properly.
05 (.6)
06 M: Cos your hands are all <u>me</u>ssy.
07 (1.0)
08 A: [(-)
09 M: [All messy with chalk,
10 A: You get it for me,(.) Put it on [A]the:re for me, ((points
11 to nearby stool during later part of this turn))
12 M: Well you've got to go and have your hands all <u>wash</u>ed if
13 you're going to have honey,
.
14 ((F then brings a cloth and wipes A's hands while she is
15 still by her mother, prior to which there is also
16 discussion as to where she will put down some chalks she
17 is still holding: 45 seconds elapse in this omitted
18 segment))
19 A: Now I'll have honey now (.) I'll sit ( )= ((moves
20 to sit in her chair))
21 M: =You're going to sit there = that's the honey chair is it?
22 A: Mm.
23 (1.0)

M: Right.
A: Here's the honey ( )?[B]((smiles as she says this, as F comes into camera shot carrying the honey))
M: ((laughs)) Is this person ((pointing to A)) a bear really?= ((by now F is also proffering the jar directly to A))
A: = No: No:[C] le:t mummy: ge:t i::t= ((with agonized voice quality, sharp moves of head to face away to her right and flailings of her arm in the direction of the honey: by the end of her turn F, in reaction to this, has passed the honey to M))
M: =Oh I've [[D]got it.
A: [NO:: NO:: (hh)(hh)= ((i.e., tearful voiced outbreaths after the "no"s; arm flailings co-occur with this turn))
M: =What d'you want me to do. =
A: = ~Ge::t it fro: [m the ta-~,
M: [I'll go and get it shall I,
A: Ge:t it fro:m ~the ta:[bl:e~?
M: [O:kay I'll go'n get it from the table.((then M gets up and goes to table))
(5.0)
M: Oh:: loo:k I've found some honey (.) fancy that, ((all done with "surprised" intonations))

A

Figure A related to Extract 1

B

C

D

Figures B–D related to Extract 1

The handwashing then duly takes place and at line 19 Amy moves to sit in her own small chair to receive the honey, which is proffered to her by me, her father, at lines 27–8. Her distressed reactions to this are evident from line 29 onward. There it is clear that she is not happy with my passing her the honey, a matter that I promptly orient to by giving the honey to her mother, for her to give it to Amy. But this too is found unsatisfactory, at line 35, and after her mother's enquiry at line 38 Amy indicates at lines 39 and 41 that she wants the honey to be put back on the nearby dining table and her mother to transport it to her from that location. This the mother does at lines 43–5, and through "Oh:: loo:k I've found some honey (.) fancy that" she acts as though the honey is being topicalized for a first time, as though the prior sequence had not taken place.

In all this the child is clearly having problems with the manner in which the honey is being transported to her, problems being exhibited in a variety of ways which include the rejection of both my proffer (line 29) and that of her mother (line 35). A first point to make is that in such positions the child has available to her alternative ways through which she might have remedied the position in which she finds herself. Where there is a mismatch between what a request is seeking and what the parent does in response to it then children of this age have ways of engaging in repair which don't involve the kind of emotional turmoil that we have found in Extract 1. For example, on occasion, after the child has made a request it is clear that a parent is passing her something other than what she wanted. In such circumstances it can prove quite difficult to establish what the child really wanted, and such sequences can be prolonged and can involve various kinds of repair strategy on the child's part, efforts which usually involve attempts by the child to indicate the object that she really wants to be passed to her (Wootton, 1994). However, such sequences do not contain the kinds of distressed reaction that we've found in Extract 1, which raises the question of what makes those rather few sequences like Extract 1 run off so differently from the more standard forms of repair that we find in both request sequences and other sequence types? Eventually, after the end of Extract 1, the child finds it perfectly acceptable to receive the honey from her mother, so what is it about the shape of this sequence which lays the basis for her rejecting such a solution at lines 34–5? To answer this we need to look at the relationship between the child's original request and the parents' efforts to grant it.

A key point in this regard is that the father's attempt to grant the request at line 28, by proffering the honey to the child, is identifiable as deficient according to any strict interpretation of what has earlier taken place. After her original request for the honey at line 1 she later specifies who is to give it to her with "You get it for me" at line 10, identifying her mother as the one to be involved in conveying the honey to her; and even though it is her father who subsequently wipes her hands, the child still has this earlier basis for expecting that her mother will take the primary role in actually giving her the honey. From the child's behavior as her father approaches with the honey it seems that she would have been happy for her father to have initially passed the honey to her mother, for her to give it to the child—at line 25 (see Figure B related to Extract 1) her face is a picture of happiness as her father comes into camera shot holding the honey jar. What prompts the initial distress is her father's proffer of the honey directly to her, an act which she has a basis for treating as in breach of an agreement as to how events are to proceed. This basis, as noted above, is one that has

been overtly established within the prior interaction, and an important feature of those distraught incidents which resemble Extract 1 is that they also contain within them such an earlier basis for the child to identify a breach of expectation.

Extract 2 contains another example of this kind of phenomenon (see also Figures A–D related to Extract 2). In the course of organizing a pretend game of shops, which involves her mother being the shopkeeper, Amy, at line 3, directs her mother to sit in a particular chair. In that vicinity there are in fact two chairs, one a small child's chair, the other an adult armchair. Between lines 10 and 21 Amy's gaze and attention are bound up with exchanges with her coshopper, her father, and it is not until line 23 that she turns to look at her mother again. What she sees prompts the immediate charged negative response that we find at line 24, and a variety of further actions that I'll address later.

Extract 2

Father (F), mother (M), and Amy (aged 2;9) are close to the dining table. There has already been discussion about playing shops, and Amy carries a bag that she has fetched for this purpose. F has just suggested to A that M be the shopkeeper.

01 A: C-c-c-come [A] o:n? ((to M, as A moves across room))
02 M: ((laughs)) =
03 A: =You sit o:n- o:n this: chair (mis [ter) shopkeeper. ((to M))
04 F: [Ye:::s.
05 F: Ye:s. ((then chuckles))
06 M: I'm going [to sit the:re am I, ((then M gets up to move
07 towards [a chair))
08 F: [Yes ((then laughs))
09 (5.7)
10 ((in this pause M goes to the chair and F moves other chairs))
11 F: Ye::s the shopkeeper should sit (way).
12 (1.7)
13 A: No.hh no: you ca::nt sit 'ere.[B] ((to F, as she picks up a
14 bag that has just fallen from a chair to the floor; at 13
15 A is inferring that F had placed the bag on the chair with
16 a view to then sitting in it))
17 F: We:ll I'm just putting this:-, ((said as he moves another
18 chair under the table))
19 (4.2)
20 F: ((A passes the shopping bag to F)) Ye:s I know I've got to
21 hold tha:t.
22 (2.1)
23 ((A turns for the first time to see where M is seated))
24 A: NO: NO: ↑NO[C]:::::::::::::::↑~NO:::::::::::::::~. =
25 ((to M; stamping and moving around room as these words
26 are said; at the end of this turn A takes hold of M's
27 hand))

28 M: =£[D]Whe:re do I sit the:n.£
29 A: ↑NO:::::. ((pulling at M's arm to get her up, M laughing))
30 (.)
31 A: ~(GE::T U::P)~, ((though by now M is up))
32 M: Whe:re do I si:t? ((being pulled across the room, out of
33 camera shot from here on))
34 A: ~GO: AWA:::::Y~,
35 M: Oh: dea::r I sat on the wrong seat I think.
36 ((A has now taken M into an adjacent room, out of
37 camera shot))

A

B

Figures A and B related to Extract 2

C

D

Figures C and D related to Extract 2

At line 24, it would have been within Amy's capabilities simply to correct her mother by saying something like "No, not that chair, this chair." Indeed, within this very same sequence we can see her engaging in one form that such remedial action can take. At line 13 she appears to be treating the fact that her father has placed his shopping bag on the seat of a nearby dining chair as an indication that he was going to sit there, when going on to engage in the shopping game as her coshopper. The bag falls off this chair, and as she stoops to retrieve it and stands up again she says "No.hh no: you ca::nt sit 'ere," thus correcting something that she felt was about to happen, and in doing so displaying a reading of her father's intentions from the

disposition of the chair and bag, the occurrence of these features in this sequential location, and so on. What occurs from line 24 is very different from such low-key corrective action. What seems to lie at the heart of this outburst is the seating position that has been adopted by her mother at lines 6–10 in response to the child's request at line 3—an analysis later confirmed by the mother's "Whe:re do I sit then" at line 28, which treats the location of where she is sitting as the main problem, and her later "Oh: dea::r I sat on the wrong seat I think" at line 35. What has been breached is an expectation that the child could feel had been established within the earlier interaction. On turning to her mother at line 23 she finds that her mother is sitting in a different chair from the one she had meant for her to sit in, the small chair rather than the armchair, one incommensurate (for the child) with what she could feel entitled to expect on the basis of the prior exchange at lines 3–7.

In both Extracts 1 and 2 the timing and nature of the child's emotional reaction appears sensitive to the existence of a prior basis that the child has for expecting events to unfold in a different way. And, in addition, in both cases, after this basis has been established, the child has engaged in further activities which are in some sense preparatory to, and predicated on, the projected course of action taking place. In Extract 1 the various hand-wiping and seating preparations noted at lines 12–21 are in anticipation of the honey being given to Amy. In Extract 2 the exchanges between Amy and her father at lines 11–21 also prepare the way for these two people to begin the shopping activity, most obviously through the father being given a shopping bag at line 20. It is not, then, that the child just has a basis for expecting events to unfold in a particular way; after that basis has been established further moves have taken place which anticipate the eventual granting of the child's request.

THE SHAPE OF THE DISTRESS

These incidents involving distress have, as we've seen, emerged from a distinctive kind of interaction scenario, one which provides a sequential basis for the child to find later parental actions to be deficient, as out of line with the projectable sequence trajectory. In such circumstances simple corrective remedies prove not to be ones which the child employs, the deficient parental act is treated as spoiling the course of events in more radical ways. In Extract 1 my remedial action of passing the honey jar to Amy's mother (line 33) for her to give it to Amy proves unacceptable. Given this it seems possible that Amy's "let mummy: ge:t i::t," at line 29, is already an indication that the remedy needs to involve more than just her mother being passed the honey jar. Be that as it may, it is certainly clear from line 39 onward that what is now being sought is some kind of replay by the mother of the whole activity of fetching the honey from the table—"Ge:t it fro:m the ta:bl:e" (line 41). Therefore a feature of the child's solution to the state of affairs she finds herself in is to restore the status quo ante, to have things now proceed along the lines they should originally have done.

In other sequences such as Extract 2 the infringement of the child's sequential expectation can have even more radical consequences. During her prolonged and tearful

"Nos" at line 24 the child stamps around the room in an agitated state, eventually taking her mother's hand and then dragging her out of the chair on which she has been sitting. Rather than then guide her to the chair that she wanted her to sit in she instead pulls her mother out of the room into an adjacent room, shuts the door on her, and returns to the room where the shopping was to have taken place. In effect she treats her mother's action of sitting in the incorrect chair as destroying the viability of the projected activity.

In these sequences, therefore, we find a combination of features. By reference to the child having a basis for expecting the course of action to take a particular form then parental actions can be identified as untoward. This untowardness appears not susceptible to remedy through simple repair, through engaging in the kind of correction of which elsewhere the child has shown herself to be capable. Through treating the situation as now in need of more radical restoration she treats the parents as having in some way spoiled or disrupted the course of events. And it is in this context that we find her displaying the verbal and nonverbal signs of distress noted in the transcripts. In this kind of sequence it is also of note that the distress itself has features which make it different from that which can be found in other sequences, and at this point I'll try and bring this out through comparison with another kind of request scenario in which distress can be generated, namely one in which the parent is not able to grant the child's request.

In Extract 3, which takes place near bedtime, Amy indicates that she wants to play farms—"Wanta play fa:rms" (line 1). Initially I respond to this with clarification checks at lines 2 and 5, a type of decision-postponing action that characteristically foreshadows a nongranting alignment on the part of the person to whom the request is being made (Wootton, 1981). Such an alignment becomes more overtly exposed at lines 10–11, by which time I have begun to move the various toys, which include ones that might be used to play farms, from the floor into the toy basket, an action recognizable as preparing to put the toys away prior to bedtime. It is from this point onward, lines 12 and 13, that Amy begins to exhibit distress, hearable within her exhalations and within several of her variously produced versions of the word "No." This negation word is used to reject and oppose my attempts to move the focus and action on to other matters, and eventually, at line 31, this all gives way to full blown crying.

Extract 3
Amy (aged 2;5) is being carried by her father into the room where the camera is when she makes the first request below:

01 A: Wanta play fa:rms.
02 F: You wanta do what?
03 (.)
04 A: Play fa:::rms.
05 F: Pla:y fa:rms?
06 A: Yea::h, ((F puts A on floor as this is said))
07 F: But we started playing farms and you stopped? ((then he

picks up toy basket))
(.)
F: Come on these things are going away now [=you help me
put them away, [
A: [( )n:o::,
A: No (hh hh) ((i.e., voiced, upset breathiness)) No: I-
(.) I::,= ((during this turn she sits on the floor and
begins to handle her toys))
F: =We've had our game (.) we've played our-we've had
[the game of farms.
A: [No:: No ↑::::(hh hh hh). ~No::::::::~.
((i.e., voiced, upset exhalations after second "no";
gazing at F for most of this time))
F: We've got a lot of things to do yet [Amy we're-we're
going to be very very busy, [
A: [~No:::: ooh~.
((upset intonation; looking at F))
(.)
A: [~No::~. ((not looking at F; plays with her toys))
F: [We- we've got lots of things to put away in the other
room as we:ll and we've got to go upstai::rs and we've
got to,.hh
(1.0)
A: ~ehNo: [: (hh hh) no:~. ((then full blown crying))
F: [Do all sorts of things,

Several contrasts can be drawn between the nature of the child's distressed behavior in Extract 3 and that which occurs in incidents like our earlier Extracts 1 and 2. The first concerns the position in which it emerges and the character of this emergence. Where distress is generated in nongranting sequences like Extract 3 then characteristically it gradually emerges in the course of the child's oppositional behavior, only reaching its peak at some later phase of the sequence. In Extract 3 a type of upset breathiness is detectable at line 13; the intonations become more recognizably upset in lines 18 and 23; eventually at line 31 we have crying proper. In Extracts 1 and 2, however, there is evidence of distress in the child's initial reaction to the carer's egregious act. In Extract 1 the child's face changes from one of pleasure in Figure B to distraughtness in Figure C, and this change is accompanied by the agonized voice quality and sharp head and arm movements described in lines 29–32. In Extract 2 the child immediately exhibits her strong opposition to what her mother has done when she first turns to look at her (lines 23–7), and, in the course of this, tearfulness immediately becomes apparent within her voice quality. Whereas the escalation of distress can be gradual in sequences like Extract 3 this is not the case in those sequences like 1 and 2.

A second differentiating feature concerns the nature of the distress. Whereas various kinds of tearfulness are the predominant exponents of this in Extract 3, other exponents become apparent in 1 and 2. In Extract 1 the reactions of the child from line 29 onward, especially the nonverbal features described in lines 29–37, also convey a sense of indignation and frustration with her mother and father; their line of action is not just being treated as not to the child's liking but as egregious in some way. In Extract 2 this egregiousness is displayed even more vividly, through the loud and prolonged "Nos" at line 24 and the punitive action of removing her mother to the adjacent room.

Third, in extracts like 1 and 2 we find the child deploying remedial solutions to her predicament of a kind never found in nongranting sequences like Extract 3. In Extract 1 her solution, as we've seen, hinges around the idea of restoring the situation to the preceding status quo, having her mother pass her the honey jar from the table. In Extract 2 the parental action is similarly being treated as spoiling the projected course of events, only in this case the action prompts the child to abandon, at least temporarily, the line of action, the shopping game, that was being prepared for.

These various observations suggest that the shape and nature of the child's distress is discriminable as between different sequence types, in this case between the kinds of sequence exemplified in Extracts 1 and 2 and nongranting sequences like Extract 3. The details of this distress are, then, linked to those distinctive features of the interaction configuration that we have found in these sequences.[1] For example, the sudden onset of the distress display found in Extracts 1 and 2 is clearly linked to the fact that the child can then recognize that there has been a breach of some earlier understanding, an understanding that we have been able to trace within the earlier interaction. This kind of configuration is not exclusive to request sequences. Elsewhere I have also shown that it can also be found within offer sequences, where similar distress reactions can occur to those we've found in Extracts 1 and 2 (Wootton, 1997, pp. 113–24). Where the child has made it clear that she wants to do something herself, where, that is, she has a basis for expecting the trajectory of a sequence to proceed in a particular way, carer attempts to "help" her by doing the act for her can be met by similar expressions of indignation, and by attempts to restore the situation to the preceding status quo.

SCRIPTS, AUTISM, AND DISTRESS

Quite often in the literature on young children, episodes of conflict are identified as centering on household routines, where the implication is that conflict arises from a breach of expectation as to how such routines should proceed (Shantz, 1987; Dunn, 1988). On the face of it our Extract 1 takes place in similar circumstances, in which a routine event, the giving and taking of food, becomes the focus of dissent. Closer inspection has revealed things to be more complex than this. What is being breached here is not a generic, transcontextual procedure as to how this event should proceed—in this house there was no rule or set procedure as to who should

pass the child honey, nor one governing where someone should sit when engaged in pretend play of the kind being prepared for in Extract 2. Instead, we've seen that the distress which transpires is linked to local understandings which the child has a basis for treating as having been established in the recent past. With certain other children, however, especially those with autism and similar, if less severe, pragmatic "disorders" such as Asperger's syndrome, there is various evidence suggesting that distress *does* appear to have a special association with the breach of more standard script-like patterns.

The special attachment of these children to routines is so well known that this forms a dimension of diagnostic instruments for these conditions (American Psychiatric Association, 1994; Bishop, 1998). One corollary of this attachment is that when such routines are altered, even in quite minor ways, then serious upset can arise. Howlin and Rutter write that many children with autism:

> become very distressed by minor changes in their environment, such as a door left in a slightly different position, or an ashtray moved a few inches out of its normal place or any redecorating in the house. A typical example of this was Stevie's distress when his parents removed a large fitted cabinet from the kitchen while he was away at school. On his return he screamed incessantly for two days, but finally, on the third night, much to his parents' relief he settled quietly. Only on waking the next morning did they discover their new paintwork completely ruined by a life size drawing of the original cupboard in indelible ink on the kitchen wall. (1987, p. 83)

The actual detail of such interactions is rarely presented in this literature, but in Extract 4 we have part of an incident involving a boy with autism which has similar features. We'll call this fluent and articulate twelve-year-old James. One of his school teachers, Fred, is visiting James's home, together with a camera operator. They are discussing another of James's teachers, Miss Chalmers, who is going to be away from school the following day. Her forthcoming absence has already been discussed on the video record made earlier that same day, and within that record there is every indication that there has also been other discussion of this matter prior to this. In the previous video segment James has become very distressed at the prospect of this teacher's absence:

Extract 4

There is a cut in the tape and we switch to a new location in the house, with James (J) sitting at the top of some stairs, elbows on his knees, hands by his ears. Fred (F) stands at the bottom of the stairs with the camera person behind him; the transcript below begins at the beginning of this filmed section:

01 J: ((his hands move to cover ears fractionally prior to turn
02 beginning)) We'll see Miss Chalmers tomorrow = .hsh::::::::::
03 ((latter sound is lateralized bilabial fricative on long
04 single inbreath + coordinated harder pressing of hands

05 over ears + strained, tight closing of eyes))
06 (1.6)
07 F: ((quiet and brief clearing of his throat))
08 ((During the silence, J continues to hold his posture,
09 though in this pause he opens his eyes and then closes
10 (4.6) them; timing of F's next turn may be sensitive
11 to a brief movement of J's hands away from, and
12 back to his ears, as though checking whether
13 there is any sound))
14 F: James I kno:w [you're upset.
15 [((J's hands tighten on his ears + opens his
16 eyes, gazing at F, then twice takes his hands
17 quickly away from his ears, as though trying to
18 (2.5) time their return to the ear when F shows signs
19 of speaking; when F next speaks the hands do
20 briefly flick back towards the ears, but the full
21 movement is stalled, and his hands are away from
22 the ears when F is speaking))
23 F: Why you keep plugging your ears up ((J's gaze shifts away
24 from F after end of turn; hand position changed in the
25 later part of this turn, so that both are now brought
26 together in front of his mouth))
27 (.8)
28 F: You don't want to hear what I'm saying? ((J's gaze returns
29 to F at turn beginning))
30 J: Yea:::h. ((then takes his hands to his ears, where his
31 hands are held momentarily in position before he moves
32 them to a front of mouth position))
33 (.9)
34 J: [((as F begins to speak J moves his hands about half way to
35 [ears; at F's repair they are then moved to cover the
36 [ears))
37 F: [Well you have to-you're gonna have to-
38 (1.4)
39 F: [Accept it Jamie.
40 J: [((J's hands begin to move from his ears; in front of his
41 face again by F's next turn))
42 (.7)
43 F: That's the way things go sometimes.
44 (2.7)
45 F: You'll see Miss Chalmers [soo::n.
46 J: [((J's hands go fast to his ears;

held there for 1.8 seconds; then moved to a side
of face position + he looks intently at F))
(3.4)
J: Tomorrow,((as he says this he puts his hands back over his
ears, and keeps them there and still looks at F))
((then some nonverbal signal from F in response, probably a headshake, prompts J to start crying again))

As with the anecdotal case from Howlin and Rutter mentioned earlier, it seems that it is a change in standard practice that lies at the heart of these events, in this case the absence from school of a teacher who is normally present. James's way of dealing with this predicament is to act as though the teacher will actually be present, as though the situation will not depart from the normal status quo—see especially "We'll see Miss Chalmers tomorrow" at line 2, and "Tomorrow" at line 50. And in a variety of ways he attempts to protect this possibility from the projectable skepticism of his recipient: by covering his ears and eyes in positions where such skepticism is expectable (lines 1–5, just ears at lines 50–51); by keeping his hands in a position, throughout the sequence, so as to prevent, rapidly, his hearing talk which runs contrary to his preference (e.g., at line 46 he quickly covers his ears so as not to hear words after "Chalmers"), and so on. The point, then, is not just that for him the breach of a normal arrangement occasions his distress but that reinstating the normal arrangement is the key to his solution for remedying matters—just as it was for Stevie in dealing with the absence of the cabinet.

Among children with autism and related conditions certain forms of sequential skill are often preserved (Ochs & Solomon, 2005, pp. 153–6), but there is, at the same time, every suggestion that generic patterns and scripts play an unusually prominent role in structuring their involvements (Wootton, 2002/3; for relevant data see also Sterponi, 2004), and this, as we have seen, also applies to those domains of action which incur distress. By contrast, we have found that the workings of episodes involving distress with Amy, a typically developing child, turn on local understandings and expectations, ones where the formation of the expectation that has been breached can be traced to the particular content of verbal interaction in the recent past. At this stage one implication needs to be brought out. The literature on children's development that gives more prominence to environmental input in shaping the emergence of children's skills has often placed much emphasis on the transmission of scripts and shared cultural presuppositions in accounting for how the child comes to incorporate his or her surrounding culture (e.g. Bruner, 1983; Valsiner, 1987). In the light of what has been argued, it is evident that the careful regard paid to generic patterns within social life in some ways fits rather better the practices of children with autism and related conditions than it does that of the typically developing child. The mastery of generic patterns and practices does not guarantee modes of involvement in online interaction which are characteristic of typically developing people. For example, Rutter and Bailey write that "it is a commonplace observation in the social skills training of autistic adults that often

they are quite adept at saying what they should do in particular circumstances, but are quite hopeless in doing what is needed when they actually encounter such circumstances" (1993, p. 493). Taken together these points give caution to accounts of the early social development of typical children which place centre stage the acquisition of generic knowledge pertaining to scripts, rules, cultural presuppositions, and the like.

TWO THEMES

In this final section I examine connections between what I have said and two kinds of literature on children: the functionalist analysis of emotion and developmental themes.

Functional Analysis of Emotion

In recent years what is termed a "functionalist" view of emotions has come to be influential in research on children (for an overview see Saarni, Campos, Camras, & Witherington, 2006). Within this framework emotions do not precede actions but are generated via events impinging on the goal that a person is pursuing. Events which are appraised as impeding attainment of a goal tend to induce negative toning: for example, sadness is associated with having to relinquish a goal, frustration or anger with having obstacles placed to goal attainment. But the identification of emotion in the behavior of the person whose goal is, in one way or another, thwarted is held to be complicated because the emotion cannot be "read off" the child's response, off the shape of the behavioral display. This is most obviously so once children's reactions are shaped by "display rules", which constrain the expression of emotions. So, on this view, in order to identify emotions various information needs to be taken into account, notably the type of action being engaged in, inferences regarding what the person's goal is or was and inferences as to the relation of the action in question to the goal's realization.

This framework has been used to make sense of various findings on children's emotion and is loosely compatible with the data that I've presented above. In extract 1, for example, we have evidence regarding the immediate goal of the child, obtaining the jar of honey for the purpose of eating it. There is then an obstacle to this goal being immediately realized, and it would not seem far fetched to describe the child's reaction as containing a mixture of anger and frustration, along lines consonant with the framework above. However, this framework does not arise from the analysis of particular episodes of interaction like extract 1; indeed, "the question of how specific emotion actions emerge during specific emotion episodes remains largely unaddressed by the functionalist framework" (Saarni et al., 2006, p. 234). An analysis of the kind that I have presented places the sequencing of action center stage, and it may be useful to draw out some of the implications that this may have for this functionalist framework.

Working with actual, online interactional data permits more ready ways of handling issues addressed within the functionalist framework. The matter of the type of action being engaged in, which also speaks to the objective of the action, can be addressed more directly, through close attention to the design of the action, its sequential positioning and the manner in which it is treated by the immediate recipient(s). In these ways the need for analytic inference which goes beyond the immediate behavioral display is much reduced. A second point is that if one proceeds in this way it remains a more open question as to whether and how analysis needs to go beyond the behavioral displays of emotion found within particular sequences. Once actions are examined within the context of the sequences which form their natural home then systematic connections with sequence types may come to be evident. This is suggested by Dickson, Walker, and Fogel's (1997) research in which they show that the design of twelve-month-old's smiles is associated with the nature of the activity in which the child is engaged with her parents. And it is suggested by my earlier observations concerning the differential shape of the child's distress in sequences where her request is being turned down (Extract 3) compared with those in which a parental act was taken as in breach of an expectation (Extracts 1 and 2). Note that all three incidents took place in a request sequence, a linked action series initiated by a child request, so in order to discriminate between these displays of distress along the lines that I have it was necessary to locate more specific action configurations within such sequences. Working along these lines, and in the light of what we know about the operation of such sequences, it would seem premature to exclude the possibility that differential exhibitions of distress are associated with particular sequence types and configurations of action within sequence types. And, by extension, the same point would hold for the examination of any kind of emotion display. This is not to say that particular actions within particular sequences will always tend to attract the same kind of emotional display. For example, when children omit a "please" from their request the parent will sometimes attempt to elicit this item, perhaps by saying "Pardon?" or "What do you say?" or "Ple-." If and when the child then produces a "please" features of its prosody can be used by the child to convey variable emotional quality. For some children the "please" can be produced in a sullen way, as though this is a disagreeable task that is being expected of them, while others can imbue their "please" with forms of prosodic creativity which treat the action as more fun and game-like (see Wootton, 1984, p. 151; 2007, p. 196 and note 10 therein).

My third point concerns the nature of what one finds when inspecting the sequential realization of emotion displays. In my initial Extracts 1 and 2 we found a variety of phenomena in some way associated with the displays of distress, action packages rather than singular displays. For example, as well as the display of tearfulness and indignation various actions also occurred which showed that for the child the course of the sequence was not normally progressable, that the parental action had spoiled the shape of the emerging course of action—this action being abandoned in Extract 2 and needing to be rerun in Extract 1. Once examined within actual stretches of interaction such systematic practices associated with the display of distress can become evident, practices which, as I have shown, are by no means uniform across the expression of all forms of distress, even just among those occurring in request

sequences. In these ways the examination of emotion *in situ* is likely to throw up collections of action packages, the properties of which will both specify and shed light on the analysis of emotion displays as systems of action.

Finally, it would seem useful to make explicit an important corollary of these various arguments. If it is the case that emotional displays are in some sense built for particular sequential positions, and if these displays are shaped so as to display a sensitivity to these positions, then there is a strong case for treating these sequential positions and their associated behaviors as the primary units for the analysis of emotion, rather than the units of sadness, anger, and so on, which are taken as primes both within the functionalist framework and much other literature on emotion.

Developmental Matters

If, as argued above, our focus is on identifying the practices that are involved in the composition of emotional displays then it follows that it is the development of these practices around which developmental enquiry needs to revolve. Many of the practices involved in this will be generic ones, ones not exclusive to episodes in which emotion displays are recognizable. Thus the child's orientation to the salience of understandings arrived at earlier in the sequence can be traced through various facets of this child's communicative conduct after the age of 2;0, as well as in cases like Extracts 1 and 2. For example, at 2;3, two months before the appearance within her transcripts of episodes like Extracts 1 and 2, I've shown that this same child's frequent usage of the word "actually" is bound up with the making of contrasts between what has earlier been agreed and what she is now stating to be the case (Wootton, 2010). And I've shown that at a similar and slightly later age her selections between those request forms that are available to her (notably imperative, declarative, and various designs of interrogative request) are similarly informed by the shape of the local interactions in which they occur (Wootton, 1997). There is every sense, therefore, that these sequential skills inform many aspects of the child's conduct at this age, that they form one component among those that make up what Levinson (2006b) has described as the "interaction engine", the set of components required to account for various features of human interaction as we know it.

If this component is of generic significance then it is likely to play a role in shaping the development of children's interactional practices through time. In my own work I've explored this mainly in the context of request development, showing how the process of linguistic differentiation is intimately connected to one of social differentiation, to locally distinctive interactional scenarios which have systematic connections with the deployment of various standardized linguistic formats for making requests (Wootton, 1997, chapter 4; 2005), a line of research that is paralleled in similar recent enquiry into adult interaction (e.g., Heinemann, 2006; Curl & Drew, 2008). In this work it is recognized that the operation of these practices has psychological entailments, indeed one thing I hope to have shown is that they make possible those particular kinds of emotional expression that we have found in Extracts 1 and 2, forms which are not present in the recordings of this child prior to

her second birthday. But these forms of analysis differ from much developmental research in that they do not place the mind and its properties center stage. When I speak of the salience of local understandings I am basing this on identifiable connections that can be made at any given time between the child's current behavior and alignments that have been taken up in the prior interaction sequence. This demonstrable connectedness suggests that the child is taking this earlier material into account in the design of her action, and it is this salience, for her, which leads me to use the term "understanding" to describe it (see also Wootton, 1997, pp. 24–6). By contrast, within much developmental work the generic feature under investigation is most commonly some characterization of the capacities of the child's mind. The literature relating to "theory of mind" is the most influential current strand of such work, indeed within this work social understanding is largely taken as equivalent to how children understand themselves and others as psychological beings (Carpendale & Lewis, 2006, p. 5, though for qualification see pp. 225–7). While this is not the impetus behind my own line of research there are, nevertheless, potential connections between these two forms of enquiry. In Extracts 1 and 2 the child organizes her conduct so as to take into account alignments that have been taken earlier in the interaction. So in the course of constructing lines of action early in her third year of life she is routinely taking into account what people have agreed to, what they know, what their preferences are, and so on (for a different type of further evidence which also suggests this within request sequences, see O'Neill, 2005). If this is so then it seems reasonable to suppose that for those with an interest in how cognitive skills emerge, such as psychologists interested in theory of mind, the distinctive ways in which the child participates in sequences of interaction can offer important clues as to how such skills come into being (for recognition of which see Tomasello, 1999; Lohmann, Tomasello, & Meyer, 2005). In this sense there are also likely to be ontogenetic connections between those practices associated with, for example, exhibitions of distress and the ways in which the child comes to make inferences regarding the emotional states of other people, though in thinking about this ontogenesis we need to resist the temptation to see it as principally powered by the structure of the child's psychological capacities (Hutchins, 2006, pp. 392–4). Structures of social interaction, as we have seen, can play their own distinctive role in shaping up psychological propensities.[2]

Looking forward in time to ages beyond three, one complication to the analysis of emotional displays is the emergence of "display rules," forms of self-control which can involve the suppression and concealment of emotional expression, and even the feigning of appearance so as to convey a particular impression to recipients. These features form a central component of the vision of social life disclosed within the writings of Goffman (1959), and Sacks (1980) develops these themes in the context of children's behavior. For example, in the game of passing the button he shows how the practices of the game can encourage children to recognize that their own appearance can matter (e.g., how they appear to the person who is guessing where the button is when they themselves are trying to conceal it) and that they can exercise a degree of control over that by, for example, deliberately acting as though they are holding the button when, in fact, they are not. Within such a game children have,

therefore, a motivation to invent, and practice, actions in which there is an embedded recognition that what they know to be true of the world can be different from what another person believes to be the case. This kind of game is probably playable among children from about five years onward, but has not been subjected to the kinds of empirical enquiry suggested by Sacks's remarks. Experimental analysis of gift giving suggests that some children younger than this, under four years old, are capable of producing smiles, or at least certain types of smile, in sequences where the gift giver is present and where the nature of the gift is designed to engender disappointment (Saarni, 1979, 1999). Another kind of event which is likely to be revealing in this regard is the child's engagement in some kind of culpable action. There is now a variety of evidence that in this context, and well before three years of age, children can design their actions so as to take account of whether their actions are seen, how they are seen, and how they can shape the reactions of other people to these actions (Dunn, 1988, chapter 2; Kidwell, 2003; Kidwell & Zimmerman, 2006). The examination of the actual organization of conduct in these kinds of sequence is likely to expose children's mastery of a much wider range of social skills than previously envisaged. Locating the ontogenesis of those practices which make an orientation to "display rules" possible will add a further dimension to the ways in which the analysis of emotional expression can be taken in new directions through the examination of naturalistic interaction.

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NOTES

1. The shape of the child's behavior in Extract 3 may also be connected with further features of the design of turns. After the child has made a request the recipient can select from various response designs to convey an unwillingness to grant the request, ranging from an outright "No" to clarification requests, deferred grantings like "Not yet" or "You can have it later," and so on (see Wootton, 1981, for an outline of this range for children aged just four years). Examination of these sequences suggests that where recipients do not initially select an overt rejection, such as "No," then this appears to form a basis for children of this age to engage in various behavior designed to have the recipient alter their negative stance. In more technical terms, where the recipient's turns are designed initially to display a preference for granting the request then the child's subsequent actions treat such turns as leaving open the negotiability of the recipient's stance. The development of such sequences is a site that has the capacity to generate various florid forms of emotional display by the child (for examples see Wootton, 1981, Extracts 49 and 50). In Extract 3 the child's request at line 1 is initially met with a clarification request which delays the production of her recipient's negative stance, and which thereby exhibits a preference for granting. And here also in her subsequent turns the child finds ways of challenging this stance.

2. If we extend this approach to children with autism then we should be examining the emergence of those interactional precursors that inform these children's concern with sameness, with continuity in the shape and character of the scenes in which they are involved. Here there is no difficulty in locating earlier interactional histories which show radical forms of communicative departure from those of typically developing children: things like delay in language onset, low levels of speech initiation once speech is available, persistent preoccupation with certain topics and themes, much repetition of the talk of others (echolalia). But in recent years the majority of ontogenetic research relating to these children has been shaped by theories as to the cognitive deficit involved in this condition, theories which principally treat the interactional features as a screen shaped by underlying cognitive processes. This is least true of the approach of Hobson (1993, 2002), which anchors autism in the disruption of the child's earlier relationship with others rather than some inbuilt cognitive deficit. But at this stage, although we can say that an orientation to sameness is consistent with many other characteristics of children with autism, the details of how such an orientation comes to emerge within actual interactional practice is not known (for some further observations on this see Wootton, 2002/3). This matter is made more complex by the fact that recent research by Stribling (2007) suggests that when interaction is examined closely some of the characterizations which have been made of children with autism may prove to be misleading. For example, although such children, in their early years, may initiate rather little in the way of conventional communication they may use other ways to initiate encounters with other people.