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## EMOTION WITHIN SITUATED ACTIVITY

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In this chapter, we will look at emotion as situated practices lodged within specific sequential positions in interaction. We argue that the relevant unit for the analysis of emotion is not the individual or the semantic system of a language, but instead the sequential organization of action. In contrast to a considerable body of research on emotion and language focusing on **emotion vocabulary** (Wierzbicka, 1992, 1995), the way people identify, classify, and recognize emotions (called “emotionology” by Stearns and Stearns [1988] and Harré and Gillett [1994]), this chapter focuses on a range of embodied practices deployed by participants to visibly take up stances toward phenomena being evaluated within the midst of situated interaction.

As linguistic anthropologists, we are interested in analyzing the *practices* through which people build the actions and scenes that constitute their lifeworlds. While in the 1960s cognitive anthropologists were concerned with mental models of culture as procedural and propositional **knowledge** (cognitive structures lodged within the individual mind), we view language as a social **tool** for organizing groups, for shaping alignment, and social identities of participants. Such a perspective is consistent with Malinowski’s (1959) early formulations of language as “a mode of social action rather than a mere reflection of thought.” For example, utterance structure can invoke participation frameworks for the organization of action, encompassing both occasion-relevant identities for participants and forms of talk. In analyzing the structure of opening accusation statements of he-said-she-said dis-

putes among urban African American children, M. H. Goodwin (1990) has shown how a single utterance such as "Kerry said you said I wasn't gonna go around Poplar no more" can be used to invoke a confrontation in important political processes among girls—ways of sanctioning inappropriate behavior that lead to ostracism from the neighborhood peer group. Such analysis of situated social action can be informed by long-term fieldwork, and more generally, data obtained within contexts of naturally occurring discourse.

The approach we adopt for understanding the orderliness of human interaction is conversation analysis, a field established by the late Harvey Sacks in collaboration with Emanuel Schegloff and Gail Jefferson (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977; for a history of the field, see Clayman & Maynard, 1994; Heritage, 1984, 1995; Levinson, 1983). Conversation analysis investigates the procedures participants employ to construct and make intelligible their talk, and the events that occur within it (Sacks, 1984). Displaying the orderliness of talk is not primarily an analytic problem for the researcher but rather one of the central tasks that participants themselves face in producing conversational moves (Schegloff & Sacks, 1973). As argued by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974):

But while understandings of other turns' talk are displayed to coparticipants, they are available as well to professional analysts, who are thereby provided a proof criterion (and a search procedure) for the analysis of what a turn's talk is occupied with. Since it is the parties' understandings of prior turns' talk that is relevant to their construction of next turns, it is their understandings that are warranted for analysis. (pp. 728–729)

Because participants in conversation display their analysis of prior talk, the sequential organization of conversation provides rigorous, empirical ways of understanding how participants themselves make sense of the talk they are engaged in.

Our methods combine extensive ethnographic research with video recording. The video camera makes it possible to record mundane talk, visible behavior and some relevant features of the settings where members of a society actually constitute their lives.

The approach of conversation analysis provides a thoroughly social rather than individual perspective on language. In our view, rather than being lodged exclusively within the psychology of the individual, we find that the cognitive resources participants deploy to construct consequential action are situated within both language practices and the cultural (Duranti, 1994, 1997; Ochs, 1988) and material features (Hutchins, 1995; Latour, 1996) of the settings where action occurs. In a study of communication in the operations room of a mid-sized airport (Goodwin & Goodwin, 1996), we found that in formulating answers to pilots, Flight Trackers make use of multiple modalities, including the Flight Information Display screen in front of them, a radio log on their desk, and a bank of monitors in the room relaying images of activity at the gates of the terminal. Likewise, scientists probing the

sea at the mouth of the Amazon rely on the instruments, computer displays, and activity across several teams of science, including physical oceanographers as well as geochemists, in order to conduct scientific investigation (Goodwin, 1995b). As Duranti (1997) has argued culture includes both material objects and ideational objects such as belief systems and linguistic codes, for both "are instruments through which humans mediate their relationship with the world" (p. 41). This chapter will investigate how girls playing hopscotch build actions that require the integrated use of both particular language formats and the semiotic field provided by the hopscotch grid, which shapes and defines actions being contested.

Fieldwork within particular settings is important if we want to investigate the full linguistic repertoire of a speech community. For example, most studies in the psychological and sociological literature have found that girls are less able than boys to incorporate argumentative talk or forceful imperative forms within their interaction (thus positing a view of girls as powerless actors). In contrast, during her fieldwork over a year and a half in urban Philadelphia, M. H. Goodwin (1998) found that girls can select from a range of different types of actions to construct widely different forms of social organization, depending on the particular situation of the moment. Fieldwork also allows us to investigate how speech forms are consequential for extensive social projects extending beyond the immediate encounter; something not possible when single encounters of talk are recorded or talk is elicited.

### EMOTION AS EMBODIED PERFORMANCE

Budwig (Chapter 10, in this volume) has argued that if we are to view children as agents in constructing their social worlds then we need to look at how language is used by children to position themselves in actual interactive situations. The following provides a first example of how emotion is situated within children's language activity. Three bilingual Spanish- and English-speaking girls (primarily second-generation Central Americans) in grades 2–5 in an elementary school located in the Pico Union/Koreatown district, near downtown Los Angeles, are playing hopscotch. Data are transcribed using the conventions of Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) described in the Appendix.

Illustrated in Figure 3.1, Carla says that she will take the next turn. This is immediately answered by a very strong display of opposition from Gloria, who claims that Carla is usurping her turn.

The oppositional turn contains no emotional terms whatsoever. Nonetheless it vividly displays a strong emotional stance on the part of its speaker, for example, what we might gloss as outraged indignation at the despicable behavior of the first speaker. How is this stance made visible? The oppositional turn begins with a **preface**, "N'ai," announcing at the earliest possible opportunity in the turn that the prior move is being objected to. Moreover this preface is spoken with a dramatic pitch excursion. Such forms of "emphatic speech style" resemble what Selting (1994) has




FIGURE 3.1

described as “peaks of involvement” within the domain of storytelling, places in a story where the speaker suddenly shifts to a marked emphatic style. Within the single syllable of the preface the second speaker’s voice leaps from 400 to 600 Hz. The display of outrage, with its associated emotional components, is made visible as an embodied performance—that is, through the way in which the second speaker controls her voice and intonation.

However, pitch height does not function as an isolated, decontextualized display. Instead it becomes visible as a specific, meaningful event, by virtue of the way in which it is embedded within a particular sequence of action. Not only the turn preface, but also the squeal of outrage, are indexically tied to the immediately prior action that constitutes the point of departure for the display of opposition. The second speaker builds her moves within a field of meaning that has been brought into existence by the conditional relevance (Schegloff, 1968) of the prior action. On the level of sound structure itself, the pitch height becomes visible as a salient action through the way in which it vividly contrasts with the talk preceding it. In essence, a single participant’s display of emotion must be analyzed by embedding it within a larger sequence of action.

Sequential slots for the production of relevant responses provide participants with a place where they can use a range of different kinds of embodied activity to build appropriate action. In Figure 3.2, Carla uses not only pitch, but also posture and gesture, to accuse another girl, Sandra (at the left of the frame grid), of having landed on a line while making a jump in hopscotch.

Once again no emotion terms are found in the semantic structure of the talk that occurs here. Nonetheless Carla vividly displays heightened affect as she accuses her opponent of being *out*. Some of the organizational frameworks that make such emotion visible and relevant will be briefly described. First, Carla’s action occurs in a particular sequential position: Immediately after Sandra’s jump, the precise place



FIGURE 3.2




FIGURE 3.3

where an assessment of the success or failure of that jump is due. By virtue of such positioning, Carla's talk is heard as an evaluation of Sandra's performance. Second, Carla's evaluation is produced immediately, without any delay after the jump. Through such quick uptake, and the lack of doubt or mitigation in the call, there is an unambiguous assertion that a clear violation did in fact occur. Third, the two *Out!* calls are spoken with markedly raised pitch, as illustrated in Figure 3.3.

The normal pitch of the girls is between 250 and 350 Hz; here, however, Carla's voice leaps dramatically to 663 and 673 Hz over the two *Outs*. Fourth, while saying *Out!* Carla points a condemning finger at Sandra. The accusation can be found not only in her talk, but also visibly in the gesture she uses. In short, affect is lodged within embodied sequences of action. Moreover, the phenomena that provide organization for both affect and action are distributed through multiple media within a larger field of action.

To further explore the scope of the field providing organization for the actions found here, consider the constitution of an *Out* in hopscotch. Speech action, and cognition more generally, are frequently assumed to lie within the domain of *mental* representations. However, an *Out* is defined by the placement of the jumper's body on an external representation: an actual grid drawn in the asphalt of the playground. The task of seeing an *Out* seamlessly integrates nonmaterial rules with actual embodied performance and cognitive artifacts (the game grid) that have a material existence at a specific place in the local environment. Consistent with the arguments of Hutchins (1995; see also Latour, 1996; Użgiris, 1996), cognition is not lodged exclusively within the head of an isolated actor, but instead within a distributed system, one that includes both other participants and meaningful artifacts, such as the hopscotch grid, which defines a public, visible arena for the constitution of specific types of action. Such objects, artifacts, and tools are not incidental but critical in the framing of human experience (Latour, 1996).

Crucial components of the cognitive activities in progress are located in the setting and in the performed actions of participants' bodies. Indeed, a moment later, Carla justifies her *Out* by walking to the grid and using her own body to "replay" the activity just seen. In much the way that a speaker can report another's speech, the feet of the judge, Carla, both replay and comment upon the errors made by Sandra's feet.

Sandra: ((jumps and lands on some lines))	<b>Problematic Move</b>
Carla: OUT! OUT!	<b>Out!</b> ((finger point))
PISASTE LA DE AQUÍ	<b>Explanation</b>
<i>You stepped on this one</i>	((demonstration))
Y LA DE ACÁ.	
<i>and this one.</i>	
Carla: PISASTE LA DE AQUÍ	
Carla: Y LA DE ACÁ	

Judges not only state verbally their objections to a player's moves in the game. In addition, in conjunction with their talk, they may provide nonvocal accounts that consist of replaying past moves to add further grounding for their positions. In challenging the player Sandra's move, Carla animatedly provides a rendition of Sandra's past mistake. As she states that Sandra had stepped on "this one" (*la de aquí*) and "this one" (*la de acá*), Carla reenacts Sandra's movement through space, challenging the player's prior move. The demonstration—involving a fully embodied gestural performance in an inscribed space—could not have been done without the grid, as it provides the relevant background—the necessary tool—for locating violations. From a slightly different perspective recent, work on deixis (Agha, 1996) has argued that an indexical term such as "this one" requires a relevant spatial superimposition in order to become meaningful. Here the indexical term in the stream of the speech, the gesture and the grid, as a semiotic field in its own right, mutually elaborate each other (see also Goodwin, 1995b, 1996a).



Figure 3.4




Figure 3.5

Turns of judges such as these display a clear orientation towards forms of “aggravated correction” (Goodwin, 1983), and thus contrast strongly with what has been described in the literature about the preference for agreement in both male and female *adult* conversation. Yaeger-Dror (1986) notes that intonation over disagreement is frequently nonsalient. Sacks (1973/1987) and Pomerantz (1984) find that in adult polite conversation disagreement is a dispreferred activity that is minimized through various features of turn design including (1) delays before the production

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of a disagreement and (2) prefaces that mitigate the disagreement. Sometimes these prefaces take the form of agreements that were followed by the disagreement.

A: She doesn't uh usually come in on Friday, does she?

B: Well, yes she does, sometimes.

Here, disagreement is mitigated by both the hesitant "Well" that precedes it and the qualifier "sometimes" that follows it.

By way of contrast, in the game of hopscotch, when calling an *Out* or a *Foul*, opposition occurs immediately, positioning the affective stance at the earliest possible place with respect to the prior turn. This is frequently followed by an emotionally charged, pejorative description of the party who committed the offense, for example, *Chiriona* ("cheater").

Gloria: ((jumps from square two  
to one changing feet))

**Problematic Move**

Carla: NO CHIRIONA!

**Polarity Expression +  
Negative Person Descriptor**

*No Cheater!*

YA NO SE VALE ASÍ.  
*That way is no longer valid!*

**Explanation**

Gloria: ((takes a turn out of turn))

**Problematic Move**

Carla: AY: TÚ CHIRIONA!

**Response Cry +  
Negative Person Descriptor**

*Hey You Cheater!*

EH NO PISES AQUÍ  
*Hey don't step here.*  
PORQUE AQUÍ YO VOY!  
*Because I'm going here.*

**Explanation**

Gloria: ((Jumps from square 3 to 2  
changing feet))

**Problematic Move**

Carla: !EY::! !CHIRIONA!  
!MIRA!

**Response Cry +  
Negative Person Descriptor**

*Hey! Cheater! Look!*

TE VENISTES DE AQUÍ  
ASÍ!  
*You came from here like this.*  
*((demonstrating how Gloria jumped changing feet))*

**Explanation**



With these examples we see that the display of a form of affect is made relevant by the structure of *practices for performing* the out call—that is, within a specific sequential position in the midst of an activity: reacting to a violation. Rather than viewing emotion as lodged within specific semantic categories, we see how it is conveyed through affective intensity (Bradac, Mulac, & Thompson, 1995) or highlighting (Goodwin, 1994) as indicated through pitch leaps, vowel lengthening, and raised volume. Unlike delayed disagreement observable in adult conversation (Pomerantz, 1984; Sacks, 1973/1987), the girls, through their intonation and gestures (such as extended hand points) display in a forceful, integrated manner that opposition is occurring, thus countering many of the stereotypical views of female language use (see also Goodwin, 1998).

The way in which an *Out* is defined by embodied action occurring at a particular location in space provides organization for the body of the judge prior to the call. In order to assess the success or failure of the player's move she must position herself so that she can clearly see the player's feet landing on the grid. A moment before the jump Carla has moved to just such a position. Indeed, the reason she is pointing with her accusing finger from a crouch is that she has bent down to look carefully at the place where the jumper will land. It is only by virtue of such perceptual access to the events being evaluated that the judge's call can be heard as a valid action (for example, if she hadn't seen the landing, her call would not be heard as a legitimate claim about what had happened). Her affect presupposes an actor positioned to assess the events being challenged. We shall see in a moment that establishing such access is a crucial feature of many other assessments as well.

### EMOTION WITHOUT A VOCABULARY

Analysis will now focus on interaction in the family of a man, Rob, with severe nonfluent aphasia. A stroke to the left hemisphere of his brain has left Rob with the ability to speak only four words *Yes*, *No*, *And*, and *Oh*. By varying his intonation and attending to sequential organization Rob is actually able to construct a range of quite diverse action with what might appear to be a very restricted vocabulary. Indeed, when embodiment and context are taken into account, it can be plausibly argued that variants of *Yes*, such as *Yeah*, with a range of different intonation contours in fact provide him with a substantially larger set of meaningful terms for communication with his interlocutors (Goodwin, 1995a). Thus, despite the extraordinary scarceness of his vocabulary Rob is a most active participant in conversation. Moreover, one of his main communicative resources is the ability to display appropriate, changing emotional alignment to the talk of others. How is this possible? His vocabulary contains no emotion words at all.

The hopscotch data revealed that powerful emotional statements could be built through use of the following: 1) sequential position, 2) resources provided by the setting where action occurs, and 3) artful orchestration of a range of embodied

actions (intonation, gesture, timing, etc.). To explore such phenomena further we will investigate the activity of assessment (see Goodwin & Goodwin, 1987), that is affectively evaluating some relevant current event, available either in the local scene or through a report in the talk of the moment. The following provide two examples of a basic action structure used to do assessment.

In Figure 3.6, Jere is holding up a calendar with photographs of birds that Pat has received as a present. Between the first and second line Jere changes the calendar so that a new bird picture appears.

Immediately upon seeing the first bird, Pat produces an audible in-breath (transcribed as “\*hhh”). Our transcription is not able to capture the precise way in which the voice quality of this in-breath, a deep inhale, displays vivid, spontaneous appreciation of what she has just seen. The inbreath is immediately followed by “Wow!.” Pat’s audible reaction to the picture constitutes what Goffman (1981) has called a *response cry*, an embodied display that the party producing it has been so moved by a triggering event





Pat:		*hhh Wow!	Those are <i>great</i> pictures.
	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">Triggering Event</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">Reactive Particle</div>	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 2px; display: inline-block;">Elaborating Sentence</div>
Pat: Jere:		Oh my °god.	Look — at that color. — Look at those colors.

FIGURE 3.6

that they temporarily “flood out” with a brief emotional expression. This is followed a moment later by a fully formed syntactic phrase which accounts for and explicates the speaker’s reaction by describing something that is remarkable in the event being responded to (see Goodwin, 1996b). When a new picture appears, this same pattern occurs a second time. Of particular relevance to the present analysis is the way in which the Reactive Particle, occurring in a specific sequential position (for example, right after the event it is heard as responding to), provides one systematic practice for making a precisely placed and appropriate display of emotion with minimal lexical resources.

We will now look at the actions of Rob, the man with aphasia, in this sequence (Figure 3.7). In response to the first bird picture, Rob produces a series of nonlexical syllables, “Dih-dih-dih-dih.” Our transcription is not able to adequately capture the voice quality through which enthusiastic appreciation is displayed in the way these syllables are spoken. When Jere flips to the second picture, Rob immediately changes his response to a rich, appreciative “YEAH:.”

As Pat’s response cries here demonstrate, the slot right after a triggering event provides a place where speakers can produce a relevant display of emotion with minimal lexical resources. Rob uses this structure to co-participate in the activity of assessing the pictures with an appropriate emotional response to them.

However, Rob’s initial response “Dih-dih-dih-dih” does not occur until well after Pat’s reaction. When the videotape is examined, we see that during Pat’s “Wow,” Rob is looking down at his food. On hearing the “Wow” (which could be




FIGURE 3.7

considered an “emphatic unit” calling for a relevant response, in Selting’s [1994] terms), he immediately starts to raise his gaze. However, he does not move it toward the speaker who produced the “Wow,” but instead to the calendar Pat is reacting to. Such gaze movement demonstrates that Rob is not simply responding to a salient bid for attention (in which case movement toward the sound and its producer would be appropriate). Instead, he analyzes the “Wow” as a component of a specific, recognizable activity—reacting to an assessable object in the local scene—and moves his gaze to the object being commented upon. This movement takes time. Only when it has been completed and Rob has had the opportunity to see the picture himself does he begin his appreciative emotional response to it.

Goffman’s (1967) elegant, but perhaps infelicitous term *response cry* might lead one to see a party’s emotional reaction to a triggering event as a matter of “natural” contingency. The event is so powerful that an actor spontaneously “floods out” on encountering it and emits an involuntary, emotionally charged response cry. The present data allow us to see that the relationship between triggering event and response cry is a matter of visible organization rather than haphazard contingency. Triggering event and response cry are fitted to each other as subcomponents of a larger activity system; each implies the other. On hearing the cry, Rob looks for what might have triggered it. It would be quite possible physically for Rob to immediately follow Pat’s “Wow” with a congruent reaction of his own, for example, rapidly produce an assessment without waiting to actually see the object being commented on. Indeed, because of her severe Parkinson’s disease, Rob’s wife does precisely this. She frequently produces sequentially appropriate assessments of events she hasn’t actually witnessed. However, Rob doesn’t do this. Instead he works to put himself in a position where he can independently assess the picture and only then reacts to it. The very simple lexical and syntactic structure of response cries masks a more elaborate grammar of practice.

Central to the organization of response cries is a particular kind of experience that requires appropriate access to the event being responded to. The nature of that access can vary. On some occasions, the assessable event might be visible, on others it might be tasted, on still others it might be made available through the report of another speaker, and so on. However, despite variation in mode of access, the party producing the response cry is making an embodied assessment of something they know in a relevant way. In these data we can observe an actor actively working to put himself in a position where he has appropriate access before producing a response that agrees with an assessment just made by his co-participant.

Stressing the importance of looking at communication as a multimodal activity that involves more than spoken language, Užgiris (1996) has argued that “affectivity, action contours, and the patterning of exchanges during interaction are a means for communication without explicit symbols” (p. 23). In the data being examined here, despite the complete absence of emotion vocabulary Rob is able to participate in an intricate emotional conversation by making use of the larger sequential structures and embodied practices through which emotion is organized as an interactive

process. His family considers him a fully alert, active co-participant. The present data reveal some of the resources that make this possible. To briefly summarize some of the practices used by Rob in this sequence: (1) he uses the slot after a triggering event to make an emotionally colored response to that event through intonation and other embodied displays; (2) like his speaking partners, he changes his response the moment a new assessable appears (moving from “*Dih-dih-dih-dih*” to “*YEAH*” as soon as the page is flipped to a new picture), and thus demonstrates through action that he is closely attending to the changing particulars of the events being assessed; (3) he recognizes that Pat’s “*Wow!*” indexes a specific kind of activity that calls for particular actions on his part if he is to coparticipate in it; 4) he attends to the grammar of response cries as embedded within a language game, a situated activity system (Goffman, 1967), that requires specific kinds of experience and forms of access to the entities being assessed. Thus, he delays production of his response until he has moved to a position where he has appropriate access to the calendar. Though he is not able to describe emotions with semantic labels, Rob participates in the social organization of locally relevant emotionally charged assessments through intricate, temporally unfolding sequences of embodied action.

Rob’s ability to control his intonation provides him with a central resource for building meaningful action. Given the importance of assessments, he has developed patterned ways of displaying appreciation through a recognizable contour. His ability to produce different kinds of syllables is quite limited; the same syllables are thus used to perform many different kinds of actions (assessments, commenting on stories, requesting attention, announcing a new topic, and so on). However, he uses a quite distinctive intonation pattern to do assessment and appreciation. A comparatively large number of syllables, typically five, is produced as a single breath group. The primary function of the syllables seems to be carrying a distinctive pitch contour. This contour varies to show Rob’s engagement and enjoyment or appreciation of the entity being assessed. Characteristically, appreciations are done with relatively high pitch. Frequently, the last syllable is elongated, or in other ways marked as different from the syllables that preceded it. This seems in part a practice for displaying that the unit is coming to a point of possible completion. Here are several examples (while the contour systematically represents some aspects of what he is doing, we would like to emphasize that much of the appreciative character of his voice is not captured by the pitch tracks). In Figure 3.8, Rob, eating with his wife, has just taken the first bite of a cheese Danish.




FIGURE 3.8




FIGURE 3.9




FIGURE 3.10

In Figure 3.9, Rob is looking at plate of fresh Danish pastries.

Rob is looking at a hummingbird photograph in Pat's calendar. Note the continual pitch variation throughout the assessment in Figure 3.10.

Further evidence for Rob's pragmatic competence and his ability to track and co-participate in what others are doing through talk is visible in the differentiated responses he provides to structurally different kinds of talk. Not only does he display enthusiasm and excitement for events being assessed; contrastively, he can affirm his disapproval and displeasure for persons and events being evaluated. In the following, we find Rob participating in an assessment sequence in which speakers are critiquing rather than appreciating the assessable object. His granddaughter Susan tells family members that the next day she will be visiting her boyfriend and his mother.

- 1 Chad: So Sue. When are you going to go see your be-
- 2 boyfriend.
- 3 Susan: Tomorrow morning. heh! ((*exhales/sighing and smiling*))
- 4 Rob: Ah dah **dah!** ((*falsestto, eyebrows go up*))
- 5 Chad: Well this is a **big thing** to meet his parents.=
- 6 (isn't it?)
- 7 Rob: (Myeah! ((*slight nod of head*))=
- 8 Susan: **Ye::s.** Well—I mean I've met his father?
- 9 but his **big thing's** to meet his **mother**?
- 10 Because he wouldn't tell his mother about us
- 11 at fi(hh)rst. eh heh!

In this sequence, we find a range of different affective stances being taken up by Rob as he tracks the unfolding events in a story in fine detail. Susan answers Chad's

question about when she is going to her boyfriend's with "Tomorrow morning" followed by a sigh. Rob quickly enters the conversation with an appreciative uptake "Ah dah *dah!*" (line 4). Chad's next question provides a sentential equivalent to this action, a request for elaboration of the story "Well this is a *big thing* to meet his parents" (line 5). The request is addressed to Susan.

One way that Rob routinely displays his tracking of unfolding events is to provide a parasitic comment in the slot designated for another speaker affectively commenting on the import of the action. At line 7, Rob provides such a comment in the slot where Susan is to reply to Chad's question, an emotionally charged "Myeah!." This matches the affective tone of the "Ye::s." that begins Susan's turns in line 8. With respect to issues of Rob's pragmatic competence note the precision timing of this move (Jefferson, 1973), the way in which it begins exactly at the first possible completion of Chad's turn and thus overlaps the appended tag question. As the sequence develops further, Rob markedly changes his coparticipation to track the unfolding structure of Susan's story:

- 8 Susan: Ye::s. Well—I mean I've met his father?  
 9 but his big thing's to meet his mother?  
 10 Because he wouldn't tell his mother about us  
 11 at fi(hh)rst. eh heh!  
 12 Rob: 'ah [nah.  
 13 Chad: [Ah..  
 14 Susan: [Because he didn't want to deal with her.=  
 15 Chad: [Why not.  
 16 Susan: I don't know. It sounds like she's not qui(hh)te,  
 17 th(hh)e be(hh)st person. I don't know. ((*shoulder shrug*))  
 18 Rob: ((*shrugs his head, looks away, mirroring Susan's gesturing body*))  
 19 Susan: \*hh She sounds a little—((*throat clear*))  
 a little protective and—  
 21 Rob: No. No. No. ((*shaking his head*)) ((*taps Susan's elbow*))  
 22 Rob: N[o no no no no no. ((*shaking head, waving hand*))  
 23 Susan: [Doesn't want her son—going out with-]  
 Rob: ((*shaking head, waving, tapping*))  
 24 Rob: [No(h) no no no [no(hh)o.  
 25 Susan: [anyone in college. [eh heh!  
 26 Chad: [°yeah hmph-heh-heh-heh-heh!  
 27 Susan: ((*looks over towards Rob*))  
 28 Jessica: Col [lege?  
 29 Susan: [A little scary.

When Susan inserts laughter at the conclusion of line 11, "Because he wouldn't tell his mother bout us at fi(hh)rst. eh heh!," both Rob and Chad (lines 12 and 13) join in a small assessment with Susan at this story segment juncture.

When Susan further elaborates why her boyfriend wouldn't tell his mother, "She's not qui(hh)te, th(hh)e be(hh)st person. I don't know." (lines 16–17) she non-

vocally comments with a small shoulder shrug. This is mirrored by Rob's head shrug and look-away. When Susan further amplifies her complaints against the mother, stating that she is a "little protective" (lines 19–20) Rob escalates his assessment. He produces a series of "no's" while shaking his head and tapping Susan's hand (line 21). As Rob initiates a new series of "no's" (line 22) this time accompanied by not only shaking his head but also waving his hand, Susan adds a new segment to her talk (line 23) and the two collaboratively assess the event as something they both find deplorable (see also Goodwin, 1980). In the final segment of co-appreciation (line 24), Rob inserts laugh particles (Jefferson, 1979), which generate laughter from Susan upon the completion of her turn.

Though his repertoire of words seems to consist largely of binary opposites—*yes* and *no*—through selection from this set and reduplication of words, he can make visible a range of differentiated stances (Goodwin, 1995a). By combining these words with gestures, head shakes, and hand waves he can make evident through multiple semiotic resources specific commentary on the events in progress. His "no's" in line 24 are timed to overlap Susan's talk, ending when it does (see Goodwin, 1986) he is thus able to show that both of them are assessing the event being described in a similar way, as something of which they disapprove.

The precision with which Rob coparticipates in this sequence, coming in and ending at breath group boundaries and tracking through differentiated participation displays the unfolding drama of this narrative, challenges many descriptions of slowness in aphasic speech because of problems with processing.

## CONCLUSION

In this chapter, we have examined how emotion is a *social* phenomenon. It is organized and made visible as a consequential event through systematic practices that are lodged within the processes of situated interaction, used by participants to build in concert with each other the events that make up their lifeworld. Two different kinds of settings were investigated: first, preadolescent girls playing hopscotch and second, interaction in the family of a man with severe aphasia.

However, despite the differences in these settings, a small, general activity system for the organization of assessments was found in both. In each a triggering event made relevant a subsequent assessment.

[Triggering Event] + [Assessment]

The public nature of the assessment makes possible an interactive organization of *co-experience*. Participants treat the assessment slot as a place for heightened mutual orientation and action.

In hopscotch, subsequent assessments provide a place for displaying a range of differentiated stances. These stances, whether outraged indignation, glee, and so on,



involve fully embodied practices, integrating syntactic choice, intonation, timing, and the tenor of a girl's body into a powerful display of emotionally charged action. Such strong position-taking challenges the traditional portrayal of girls and their play in the psychological literature. According to Leaper (1991), while boys seek "independence, competition, and dominance" in their interactions with others, girls strive for "closeness, cooperation, and interpersonal harmony" (p. 798; see also Maccoby, 1990). Rather than structuring their game playing on principles of cooperative interaction or a morality based on relatedness, equity, or responsibility, we instead find girls vividly producing their out calls to construct opposition.

Analysis of the actual talk of participants, rather than reports of talk (see, for example, Lever, 1978), permits us to view how displays of emotion emerge within interaction and have strong social consequences; thus, through powerful displays of righteous indignation girls show a strong orientation to the possibilities that games provide for testing, negotiating, and challenging rules and their situated applications. Piaget (1965) argued that the legal sense is little developed among young girls. By way of contrast, here we find young girls pursuing powerful legal debate about the scope of rules and their application. This is quite consistent with earlier findings (Goodwin, 1990) about how the he-said-she-said of African American girls constitutes a vernacular legal process, one that was far more powerful and extended than anything found in the interaction of the boys they played with.

In the aphasia data, the assessment organized different forms of appreciation, approval and disapproval. Across all cases, what is called for is an *embodied performance* of affect through intonation, gesture, body posture and timing. An explicit emotion vocabulary is not necessary for powerful displays of emotion with language in its full pragmatic environment. This is particularly crucial for Rob, who because of his aphasia, has no lexical terms for emotion. Though his possibilities for speech are limited, by varying what tokens he does have at relevant moments within the stream of interaction, Rob is able to demonstrate through his visible coparticipation finely placed ongoing analysis of changes in the events he is engaged in.

Within a Bakhtinian, textually biased theory of language practice that focuses exclusive attention on phenomena within the stream of speech, Rob appears as a severely limited actor, someone who quite literally talks in nonsense syllables. Similarly, if participation is conceptualized simply as a structural position within a speech event, a point within a typology, then the intricate analysis Rob is performing of the organization of ongoing activities, his cognitive life as a participant in a relevant course of action, remains inaccessible to study. However, when utterances are analyzed as participation frameworks which invoke a domain of temporally unfolding embodied action through which multiple practices build in concert with each other the events that constitute their lifeworld, then Rob emerges as a competent actor capable of finely coordinated participation in the activities that make up a state of talk.

Through assessments like these, participants are able to display that their minds are together—that they evaluate the events being assessed in a similar way. Within such a framework, language resides within a community of interacting participants rather than in the syntactic abilities of an isolated speaker. Though unable to speak himself, Rob uses structure visible in the language of others to participate in a state of talk by co-constructing relevant action.

From a slightly different perspective, focus on participation lodges embodiment within socially organized practices. Recently, Tyler (1995) observed critically that despite contemporary interest in the notion of embodiment much of it remains

little more than expressions of faith, and evidence of the continuing hold of Cartesianism on our minds, for the idea of embodiment is little more than an unthinking ego, constructing itself out of its own body in lonely isolation from all other bodies. (p. 569)

By way of contrast, all the data examined here demonstrate how the body becomes a site for visible meaningful action by being embedded with the participation frameworks used to build relevant action within endogenous settings.

## APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPTION CONVENTIONS

Data are transcribed according to a modified version of the system developed by Jefferson and described in Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974).

**Cut offs:** A dash (-) marks a sudden cut-off of the current sound.

**Bold:** Boldface indicates some form of emphasis.

**Overlap Bracket:** A left bracket (l) marks the point at which the current talk is overlapped by other talk.

**Lengthening:** Colons (::) indicate that the sound immediately preceding has been noticeably lengthened.

**Intonation:** Punctuation symbols are used to mark intonation changes rather than as grammatical symbols: A period indicates a falling contour, a question mark indicates a rising contour, and a comma indicates a falling-rising contour.

**Inbreath:** An *h* preceded by an asterisk (\**h*) marks an inbreath.

**Comments:** Double parentheses (( )) enclose material that is not part of the talk being transcribed, frequently indicating gesture or body position.

**Silence:** Numbers in parentheses (0.6) mark silences in seconds and tenths of seconds.

**Increased volume:** Capitals (CAPS) indicate increased volume.

**Breathiness, laughter:** An *h* in parentheses (hhh) indicates plosive aspiration, which could result from breathiness or laughter.

**Problematic hearing:** Material in single parentheses indicates a hearing the transcriber was uncertain about.

**Italics:** Italics are used in two situations: (1) to distinguish comments in parentheses about nonvocal aspects of the interaction and (2) for English translations.

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