5 Turn Construction and Conversational Organization

CHARLES GOODWIN

Conversation provides a prototypical example of human communication. Indeed, Heritage and Atkinson (1984, pp. 12-13) have argued that conversational interaction

> has a "bedrock" status in relation to other institutionalized forms of interpersonal conduct. Not only is conversation the most pervasively used mode of interaction in social life and the form within which, with whatever modifications . . . language is first acquired, but also it consists of the fullest matrix of socially organized communicative practices and procedures.

The most intensive study of the organization of human conversation has been provided by Harvey Sacks and his colleagues. The analysis discussed in this chapter uses their work as a point of departure.

Methodologically, the work initiated by Sacks differs from much other work in communications research in that it does not use experimental manipulation, interview techniques, or category systems for coding data (see Heritage & Atkinson, 1984, pp. 2-3). Sacks wanted to explore the possibility of creating "a natural observational science" that would be able to subject "naturally occurring social activities" (Sacks, 1984, p. 21) to formal description and analysis:

> When I started to do research in sociology I figured that sociology could not be an actual science unless it was able to handle the details of actual events, handle them formally, and in the first instance be informative about them in the direct ways in which primitive sciences tend to be informative—that is, that anyone else can go and see whether what was said is so. And that is a tremendous control on seeing whether one is learning anything. (Sacks, 1984, p. 26)

AUTHOR'S NOTE: I am deeply indebted to Barbara O'Keefe for very helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter.

To accomplish this he focused his study on singular events in tape recordings of actual conversations occurring in a wide range of natural settings:

> It was not from any large interest in language or from some theoretical formulation of what should be studied that I started with tape-recorded conversations, but simply because I could get my hands on it and I could study it again and again, and also, consequentially, because others could look at what I had studied and make of it what they could, if, for example, they wanted to be able to disagree with me. (Sacks, 1984, p. 26)

Theoretically, conversation analysts seek to describe the procedures used by participants in conversation to produce and understand that behavior.[1] In essence the question is not *why* some particular action is done but *how* conversational events are accomplished as the systematic products of orderly procedures. The stance taken is similar to that adopted by linguists toward language. Rather than evaluating a sentence in aesthetic terms (as is done for example in rhetoric, literature, and folklore), or using it as a transparent window to gain access to some "meaning," linguists focus their inquiry on the question of how it is possible to construct objects such as sentences in the first place. Similarly, conversation analysts seek to make explicit the procedures participants employ to construct and make intelligible their talk, and the events that occur within it.

Several examples of the phenomena that conversation analysts investigate will help clarify this point:

—Instead of coding turns at talk as a way of investigating the characteristics of different kinds of groups (for example, work within the tradition initiated by Bales, 1950), conversation analysts focus on how the process that makes such coding possible the way in which human beings coordinate the talk of separate individuals through *turn-taking*—is itself organized as a social activity (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974), one that indeed provides an interactive substratum for both basic processes in the social world (Schegloff, in press), and many of the phenomena that have been made topics of inquiry within the social sciences.

—Similarly, instead of focusing analysis on psychological reasons that might lead to "slips of the tongue" or "speech errors," conversation analysts seek to specify the procedures that participants within conversation deploy to accomplish *repair* of talk as a coherent, socially organized activity in its own terms (C. Goodwin, 1981, 1987; Jefferson, 1973; Schegloff, Jefferson, & Sacks, 1977).

—Much previous work in nonverbal communication has proceeded by summing frequencies of eye contact to make inferences about hidden attributes of participants (for example, whether or not they are attracted to each other, whether one is trying to establish dominance over the other). By way of contrast, conversation analysis focuses on procedures available to participants for systematically bringing about a state of eye contact in the first place, and the relevance that this has to the tasks they are then engaged in, such as building a turn at talk (some of this work will be described in this chapter).

The perspective toward language taken by conversation analysts differs from that of many linguists in that it does not take either the isolated speaker, or the isolated sentence, as an adequate point of departure for analysis. Rather language is conceptualized as a domain of competence that is intrinsically social and interactive (Garfinkel, 1967). Thus a key locus for research has been the *sequential* organization of conversation, the proposal that "utterances are *in the first instance* contextually understood by reference to their placement and participation within sequences of actions" (Heritage & Atkinson, 1984, p. 5).

Using this research as a point of departure, the work to be reported on in this chapter examines how the turn at talk is constructed within conversation. Essays in the present volume are intended to exemplify a particular paradigm to scholars who do not work within it. In order to present basic features of this research in as clear a fashion as possible, I will use as examples simplified versions of analysis that is published in more detail elsewhere (see in particular C. Goodwin, 1981).

Data and Transcription

Data for the present research is drawn from videotapes of conversations recorded in a range of natural settings such as family dinners, a teenage swim party, an ice cream social of the Loyal Order of the Moose, and so on. The talk on these tapes is transcribed according to a system developed by Gail Jefferson (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974, pp. 731-733). The following are the transcription conventions that are most important for the present analysis:

—*Numbers within parentheses* code silences in tenths of seconds.
—*Dashes* mark abrupt "cut-offs" in the talk.
—*Italics* indicate that the talk so marked is pronounced with special emphasis.

For a more complete description of both the data and the transcription system, see C. Goodwin (1981).

Securing Mutual Orientation Within the Turn

For many contemporary linguists, what people actually say is considered a very poor source of data for the study of human language. This position is based on Chomsky's (1965, pp. 3-4) observation that actual speech contains many restarts and pauses, and thus provides data of such "degenerate quality" (Chomsky, 1965, p. 58) that it is of limited usefulness for the study of linguistic competence.

A cursory look at samples of actual talk seems to support Chomsky's position:

(1) G.126:3:30
Debbie: Anyway, (0.2) um:, (0.2) we went t- I went to bed really early.

(2) G.76:652

Barbara: Brian you're gonna hav- You kids'll *have* to go down *clo*ser so you can *hear* what they're gonna do.

(3) G.58:410

Sue: I come in t- I no sooner sit down on the couch in the living room, and the doorbell rings.

In these data one does indeed find many restarts and pauses.

In actual talk, however, sentences are not produced in a vacuum but rather emerge within particular social arrangements. Among the most central for the organization of language is what has come to be called turn-taking (Sacks, Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974), that is, the process through which different participants exchange turns at talk. Understanding the social production of language must thus take into account a study of the interactive organization of the turn at talk. Central to this project is the recognition that a turn at talk, far from being the product of the isolated action of a single individual, is instead constructed through the collaborative work of multiple parties—both speaker and hearers—and is thus an intrinsically social activity.

Although the participation of the speaker in a turn is apparent, the role of the hearer has not received much attention. Some formulations of the hearer's position describe the hearer as having only a minimal role during the speaking turn. For example, Duncan and Fiske (1977, p. 177) define an auditor as "a participant who does not claim the speaking turn at a given moment." Conceived in this fashion, the duties of a hearer are essentially negative: he or she is required only to be a nonspeaker, not to work actively at being a hearer. As long as he or she does not try to claim the floor, other actions he or she engages in are not relevant to, and without consequences for, the turn of the current speaker. As Sacks (1967, p. 7) has observed, this formulation of the hearer role does not adequately reflect the necessary reciprocity between speakers and hearers:

> One wants to make a distinction between "having the floor" in the sense of being a speaker while others are hearers, and "having the floor" in the sense of being a speaker while others are doing whatever they please. One wants not merely to occupy the floor, but have the floor while others listen.

This suggests that hearers have definite obligations within the turn and that, by virtue of these obligations, speakers are able to assess whether or not others present are in fact acting as hearers. This is especially important where the actions of the hearer are in fact *relevant* to the speaker's own participation in the turn, that is, something that speakers not only attend to but organize their own behavior with reference to.

How might recipients be able to display to speakers that they are in fact acting as hearers? Gaze direction is one of the most pervasive methods used by human beings (and other animals) to show others where their attention is focused (Ken-

don, 1967, p. 59-60). Thus one possible way that a party in face-to-face conversation might display to others present that he or she was in fact acting as a hearer is by gazing toward the speaker.

To study the role of gaze in the turn system, one must develop methods for representing the placement of gaze relative to the ongoing talk in a conversation. In the work discussed below, a rather simple transcription system has been used to represent patterns of gaze as they are employed in relation to talk:

(1) Recipient's gaze is placed below speaker's talk;
(2) a line indicates that recipient is looking toward the speaker, while the absence of such a line indicates that the recipient is gazing elsewhere; and
(3) the precise point where recipient's gaze reaches speaker is indicated by an "X" tied to the speaker's talk with a bracket.

When the actions of the hearer are included in our analysis of examples 1-3, it is found that speaker's restart occurs precisely at the point where hearer's gaze reaches speaker:

```
(1) G.126:3:30
    Debbie:  Anyway, (0.2) Uh:, (0.2) We went t- I went ta bed
    Chuck:                                   [X_______________

(2) G.76:652
    Barbara: Brian you're gonna ha v- You kids'll have to go
    Brian:                        [X___________________________

(3) G.58:410
    Sue:     I come in t- I no sooner sit down on the couch
    Diedre:           [X_______________________________________
```

In these instances speakers abandon the talk produced while recipient was not gazing and begin a new, coherent sentence precisely at the point where they obtain their addressee's gaze.

Reconstruction of Turns in Response to Hearer Actions

Let us now reconsider the argument that sentence fragments demonstrate the defective performance of actual speakers. Within conversation, speakers are faced not simply with the task of constructing sentences, but with the task of producing sentences for hearers. Suppose a recipient begins to display proper hearership well after the speaker has begun to produce a sentence. If the speaker brings that sentence to completion, his utterance will contain a coherent sentence and no sentence fragment. When the actions of both speaker and hearer are taken into consideration, however, the complete sentence may in fact constitute a fragment, because only part of it has been properly attended to by a hearer:



By beginning a new sentence when the gaze of the recipient is obtained, the speaker is able to produce his entire sentence while he is being gazed at by the hearer. In short, rather than providing evidence for the defective performance of speakers in actual conversation, restarts may show that speakers in fact work to produce coherent, unbroken sentences that are attended to appropriately by recipients.

Examples such as these show how the production of a sentence within a turn at talk is embedded within a process of communication between speaker and hearer. In order to accomplish basic features of that process (e.g., appropriate reception of the current talk by its intended recipient), speakers are capable of abandoning talk that recipients have not properly attended, and replacing it with new talk that is oriented to appropriately.

From a slightly different perspective, social psychologists (for example, Seigman, 1979) have treated restarts and other "performance errors" in talk as the product of processes entirely internal to speaker, such as anxiety, cognitive difficulty, or problems in encoding what is being said. The way in which speaker's restarts in the above data coincide precisely with recipient's gaze arrival provides some demonstration that the traditional perspective on speech errors is inadequate; that is, that rather than resulting from processes entirely internal to the speaker at least some phrasal breaks have a social and interactive component.

The patterning found here is also relevant to the analysis of how participants distinguish events from each other in ways that are consequential for the organization of their behavior within the turn at talk. In analyzing language, linguists have found it important to differentiate between *etic* phenomena, all of the distinctions that an analyst measuring speech might be able to code, and *emic* phenomena, the distinctions that are actually used by speakers of a language. For example, in Japanese the distinction between "l" and "r" is not significant while for speakers of English it is. What is at issue here is not simply a perceptual distinction but a functional one; the difference between "l" and "r" is important to

speakers of English because it functions to distinguish words such as *late* from words such as *rate*.

The distinctions between states of gaze found in the present data have similar functional consequences. The sentence being produced before the gaze of the recipient was obtained is abandoned without being brought to completion. When the speaker has the gaze of his recipient, however, a coherent sentence is produced. Thus rather than having a situation where an analyst codes lack of gaze as displaying inattentiveness, one finds here data where the participants themselves treat such an event as dispreferred by marking the talk in progress where it occurred as defective. Moreover, the distinction between having the recipient's gaze and not having it is functional in that it is not only attended to and recognized by participants, but used by them as a constitutive feature of the activities they are engaged in; that is, they vary their behavior in terms of this feature.

In the data just examined speakers reacted to what their recipients were doing. These same resources, however, can also be used to actively solicit changes in recipient's behavior. For example, rather than simply waiting for the recipient's gaze to arrive, the speaker can use either a restart or a pause beginning to *request* such gaze. In the following recipients begin to move their gaze to speaker right after speaker produces either a restart or a pause beginning. Dots are used to mark the movement of recipient's gaze toward speaker, and dashes within a parentheses marks tenths of seconds.

```
(4) G.76:652
    Ethyl:     So they st-[their clas[ses start around
    Barbara:               . . . . . . X____________

(5) G.76:214
    Barbara:   Uh:, my kids. ([------[-) had all these blankets
    Ethyl:                     . . . . X______________________
```

In these data recipients treat speaker's phrasal breaks as signals that their gaze is being requested, that is, just after the phrasal break recipients begin to turn their attention to speaker. In essence the phrasal break acts as a *summons* with the recipient's gaze movement being an answer to it. Schegloff (1968) has demonstrated how summons-answer sequences can be used to organize the talk of separate speakers into a single action framework. Here we find how such structures for coordinating action *between* turns can also function *within* a single turn. Summons-answer sequences can thus function not only to provide coordinated entry into a conversation (Schegloff, 1968, p. 1089), but also to establish the availability of participants toward each other within the turn itself.

One might ask why speakers don't request the gaze of their recipients directly, that is, why do they use restarts and pauses to signal their recipients within the

turn instead of producing an explicit summons? Despite their surface disorderliness, phrasal breaks in fact provide a very efficient means for attracting the attention of wayward recipients. Consider what would happen if an explicit summons, such as "Hey, look at me," were used to request recipient's gaze: the talk that speaker was trying to get recipient to listen to would be suspended while speaker talked about recipient's lack of attentiveness. Moreover recipient, hearing the summons as a complaint, might well try to offer a defense so that an extended sequence diverging from the original talk would be engendered. In that phrasal breaks do not deal explicitly with recipient's lack of gaze, the attention of the participants remains focused on speaker's original talk. From a slightly different perspective, if obtaining appropriate coparticipation from a recipient is in fact a systematic task posed in the interactive organization of talk, then it would be advantageous to speakers to have resources for accomplishing that task that were as general as possible. Phrasal breaks are not restricted in content and indeed are applicable to any sentence whatsoever. Moreover, because the flow of the utterance is interrupted in a very noticeable fashion, a hearer can recognize the occurrence of a phrasal break quite independently of the content of the particular utterance in which it occurs. Being widely usable and extremely noticeable, phrasal breaks are well suited to serve as signals between speakers and hearers.

Adding New Segments to an Emerging Sentence

Speakers have the ability to add new segments to an emerging utterance; this facilitates coordination of their talk with the relevant actions of their hearers. The processes through which speakers construct sentences to fit hearer actions produced during the turn at talk serve as a paradigmatic illustration of the intrinsically social character of linguistic performance.

The interactive accomplishment of specific tasks posed in the construction of the turn can lead to changes in the sentences that speakers are producing. In the following example, the recipient fails to bring her gaze to the speaker before his sentence reaches a point of possible completion:

(6) G.26:19:15
John: An' how are you *feeling*? (0.4)
Ann:

The data examined above in which speakers requested the gaze of nongazing recipients provided some evidence that having the gaze of a recipient was relevant to the successful construction of a turn by a speaker. The actions of both speaker and recipient in the current example are consistent with the possibility that the present turn is being treated as unsuccessful. First, it may be observed that the structure of speaker's talk, and in particular the way in which it addresses a ques-

tion to its addressee, transfers the floor to recipient at its completion. Recipient does not produce any talk, however, and a gap occurs. The recipient thus displays that she is not treating the speaker's talk as sequentially implicative for subsequent talk on her part. Second, as soon as his sentence comes to completion, the speaker, rather than displaying that he is waiting for his addressee to start, begins to place an egg roll in his mouth.

At this point the recipient belatedly begins to move her gaze toward the speaker (dashes mark tenths of a second within a silence):

6) G.26:19:15
John: An' how are
you *feeling*? (– [–) °these [days,
Ann: . . . . ___________

As soon as the recipient acts, the speaker withdraws the eggroll from his mouth. He then adds a new segment, "these days," to his utterance. The gap now becomes a within-sentence pause, and the recipient is located as achieving orientation during the production of the single sentence that constructs the turn.

The phenomena examined so far provide some demonstration of how basic features of the turn at talk, such as establishing and maintaining mutual orientation between speaker and hearer, are accomplished through an ongoing process of communication within the turn itself.

•

Designing Talk for Different Types of Recipients

We will now briefly investigate some ways in which talk proposes specific characteristics for a recipient to it and the consequences this has for the organization of action within the turn. In the following, three parties—Pat, Jere, and Chil—are teaching a fourth—Ann—how to play bridge. Pat is explaining the bidding system to Ann. Analysis will begin with the talk in Line 5.

7) G.23:490
1. Pat: *N*ow Ann you gotta count points.
2. (1.0)
3. Ann: Oh Okay.
4. (15.8)
5. Pat: Now if you have thirteen *po*ints, (1.0)

It may be noted that Pat's utterance proposes an ordered, but unequal, distribution of information between the participants: that is, the speaker is engaged in an activity of telling the recipient something that the recipient does not yet know.

Specific characteristics are thus posited for both an appropriate recipient and an appropriate speaker. For convenience, a recipient who is proposed to lack relevant information that the speaker possesses will be referred to as an *unknowing recipient*; a recipient who is supposed to possess information that the speaker lacks will be referred to as a *knowing recipient*. This latter situation arises with many requests (e.g., "Where is Grand Central Station?"). Note that in such requests, as in the action being considered in the present data, the information states proposed for speaker and hearer remain complementary to each other.

The utterance Pat constructs in the present data thus proposes criteria for a recipient to it that Ann, a party who has not yet learned the rules of bridge, meets. Ann, however, does not direct her gaze to the speaker. During the pause, Pat looks at her intended recipient and discovers that, rather than looking at her, Ann is continuing to gaze at her cards.

In the data examined above it was seen that speakers who find that they do not have the gaze of an addressed recipient have access to systematic procedures for requesting such gaze. In the present case, however, what the speaker finds is not simply that gaze is absent, but that her recipient is engaged in another recognizable activity relevant to the talk being produced, that of analyzing her cards. Further, this is an activity that might have to be brought to some sort of completion before the recipient will be able to deal with the "then . . ." clause projected by the "if . . ." clause in the talk already spoken.

Rather than continuing to locate Ann as her addressed recipient, Pat moves her gaze to another recipient, Chil.

(7) G.23:490

```
                                            . . .[Ann
Pat:  Now if you have thirteen points:,(——— ——)
Ann:
      ________, , . .   Chil
      counting:
```

Unlike Ann, Chil knows how to play bridge. Explaining to a novice, such as Ann, the details of the bidding system is both necessary and helpful. Telling an experienced bridge player these same facts is either insulting or absurd.

Pat is thus faced with the task of reconstructing her utterance from one that proposes the ignorance of its recipient about the event discussed in the utterance to one that proposes that its recipient has knowledge of that event. She accomplishes this task of moving from an unknowing recipient to a knowing one by changing her intonation so that her statement becomes marked as problematic. The pronunciation of "voi:ds?"—the place in her utterance where her eyes reach Chil—is characterized by both a slight rise in intonation and an elongation of the syllable being spoken:

(7) G.23:490

```
                                              . . .[Ann
Pat:  Now if you have thirteen points:,(—— —)
Ann:
      ——, , . . [Chil
      counting: voi[:ds?
```

Through this change in intonation, uncertainty is displayed about what Pat is saying. A new action is therefore embedded within the ongoing statement. This new action, a request for verification, proposes that its recipient is knowledgeable about something that the speaker is unsure of. These data thus provide another example of how processes of interaction within the turn at talk can lead to changes in the sentence that a speaker is producing, even as that sentence is emerging.

In producing her new action, Pat does not simply change the state of knowledge proposed for her recipient; by displaying uncertainty about some aspect of the same phenomenon that she is elsewhere presenting herself as informed about, she changes her own state of knowledge.

```
Speaker                                    Recipient

Knowing  - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > Unknowing_Ann

Uncertain - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - > Knowing_Chil
```

The reciprocal changes in the states of knowledge proposed for both speaker and recipient have the effect of maintaining a complementary distribution of knowledge between them despite the fact that both action and recipient have been changed. It is possible to find actions that have both a knowing speaker and a knowing recipient (reminiscing, for example). However, the fact that the speaker here changes not only attributes of her recipient, but also relevant attributes of herself raises the possibility that what is at issue is not the properties of a single individual, but rather an organized field of social action including features, such as complementarity, ordering the attributes of separate participants relative to each other.

It can also be noted that the talk to the knowing recipient continues to be relevant to the unknowing recipient. The talk addressed to Chil deals with how the activity of counting points—the activity Ann is performing—is to be done. It is thus inadequate to talk simply of this utterance as having an addressee; rather than being addressed to a single recipient, the utterance provides for the participation. not just of multiple recipients, but of recipients who differ from each other significantly in ways relevant to the talk in progress.[2]

There are in fact systematic reasons for speakers to be repetitively in a situation in which they must deal with the copresence of both knowing and unknow-

ing recipients. For example, spouses share much of their experience in common. Trying to tell a story to an unknowing recipient when one's spouse is present leads to troubles (for example, competition, bitterness, feelings on the part of the nonteller that he or she is being slighted, dominated, and so on) that arise not from the particular relationship of the couple involved, but rather from very general constraints, such as recipient design, that give organization to the social production of talk. Requesting verification from one's partner provides one resource for building a turn capable for providing for the simultaneous participation of mutually exclusive types of recipients. The repeated forgetfulness that is sometimes found when spouses are in each other's presence might thus be socially engendered. Rather than reflecting cognitive difficulty, such uncertainty, because of its interactive organization, provides a resource for dealing with some of the consequences that sharing experience with another has for the organization of talk.

Within the scope of this chapter it has been possible to look at only a very small sample of the types of phenomena that are relevant to the interactive construction of the turn. More recent research has investigated issues such as different types of recipient responses (C. Goodwin, 1986; C. Goodwin & M. H. Goodwin, 1987; M. H. Goodwin, 1980; Jefferson, 1983, 1984), the simultaneous but differentiated participation of alternative types of recipients in more complex turns such as stories (C. Goodwin, 1984), and the coordination of speech and body movement within the turn (Heath, 1984, 1986).

Conclusion

The research described here has focused upon the internal structure of the turn at talk by investigating the procedures employed to construct actual utterances within conversation. It has been found that both the turn and the objects constructed within the turn, such as sentences, emerge as the products of a process of communication between speaker and hearer. Such research has a clear relevance to a number of theoretical issues posed in the analysis of communication.

First, conversation is one of the most basic and pervasive forms of communication that human beings engage in, one that includes not only the essential structures of focused interaction (Goffman, 1963) but also constitutes the prototypical place where language emerges in the natural world.

Second, many communications researchers have assumed that a unit smaller than the exchange of turns cannot be investigated as a communications process. For example, Coulthard and Ashby (1975, p. 140) state that "the basic unit of all verbal interaction is the exchange. An exchange consists minimally of two successive utterances: one speaker says something and a second says something in return. Anything less is not interactive." Similarly, Rogers and Farace (1975, p. 226) argue that "the smallest unit of relational analysis is a paired exchange of two messages," where *message* is defined as "each verbal intervention by participants in dialogue" (Rogers & Farace, 1975, p. 228). The phenomena examined in this chapter have demonstrated that processes of communication do

indeed occur *within* the turn, and that sentences can be shaped by interaction between speaker and hearer even as they are emerging.

Third, a consistent problem in the study of interpersonal communication has been the location of appropriate units for analysis. In general the objects participants within interaction in fact construct, such as actual utterances, have not been made the primary subject of analysis. Rather these objects have been transformed into other objects through the use of a category system.[3] Analysis has then focused upon relationships between these categories rather than upon the phenomena in fact emerging within conversation in the first place. The present research has focused analysis upon the objects actually being constructed within the interaction, such as specific sentences.

Fourth, methodologically the phenomena generated within the turn at talk not only provide the opportunity to study in detail actual instances of human interaction, but manifest a sequential structure of the type located by Krippendorff (1969) as essential for true communications analysis. Interaction is a time-bound process, but many methodologies employed in studying interaction are insensitive to the intimate relation between meaning (or function) and *placement* relative to other interactional events. For example, summing frequencies of gaze over an entire interaction is one common practice that necessarily obscures the dynamic properties of gaze as well as the ways in which changes in states of gaze influence states of talk.

From a slightly different perspective, when analyzing human communication one should employ methods of analysis that are sensitive to the collaborative production of interaction. Interaction is intrinsically social in that it is constructed through the mutual action of separate participants. Most systems that purport to code interaction, however, actually code only talk, and consequently ignore the hearer's participation entirely. Although some systems (e.g., Stiles, 1981) may analyze speaker behavior as reflecting assumptions made about the hearer and the hearer's state, few examine the hearer's actual behavior as a phenomenon in its own right.

The analysis of the turn at talk, and of conversation in general, provides an arena for the study in an integrated fashion of a diverse and important range of human social competence: the ability of participants to construct meaning and to create a coherent phenomenal world, their ability to produce language, and their ability to construct social order. Moreover, the vocal and nonvocal activities of the participants within the turn produce highly structured products such that specific interactive processes can be examined not only in detail but also through time. For both theoretical and methodological reasons the analysis of conversation would thus seem to constitute a crucial locus for the study of human communication.

NOTES

1. Important collections of research in conversation analysis can be found in Atkinson and Heritage (1984), Button and Lee (1987), Schenkein (1978), the special double issue of *Sociological Inquiry*

edited by Zimmerman and West (1980), and a special issue of *Human Studies* edited by Button and Drew (1986). Turn-taking is most extensively analyzed in Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974). The investigation of phenomena within the turn, including the interdigitation of verbal and nonverbal behavior in that process, is dealt with at length in C. Goodwin (1981) and Heath (1986). For an analysis of both basic ideas in ethnomethodology and work in conversation analysis that grows from it, see Heritage (1984). Levinson (1983) provides a review of conversation analysis that focuses on its contributions to pragmatics. For examples of how conversation analysis can be applied to the analysis of larger institutions, see Atkinson (1984), Atkinson and Drew (1979), and Maynard (1984).

2. For more detailed analysis of how talk can simultaneously address different types of recipient, see Holmes (1984).

3. A good review of the different category systems that have been employed to code verbal interaction is found in Rogers and Farace (1975).

REFERENCES

Atkinson, J. M. (1984). *Our masters' voices: The language and body language of politics*. London: Methuen.

Atkinson, J. M., & Drew, P. (1979). *Order in court: The organisation of verbal interaction in judicial settings*. London: Macmillan.

Atkinson, J. M., & Heritage, J. (Eds.). (1984). *Structures of social action*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Bales, R. F. (1950). *Interaction process analysis: A method for the study of small groups*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Button, G., & Drew, P. (Eds.). (1986). *Human Studies* [Special Issue]. Dordecht, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff.

Button, G., & Lee, J. R. (Eds.). (1987). *Talk and social organisation*. Clevedon, England: Multilingual Matters.

Chomsky, N. (1965). *Aspects of theory of syntax*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Coulthard, M., & Ashby, M. (1975). Talking with the doctor. *Journal of Communication, 25*, 140-147.

Duncan, S., Jr., & Fiske, D. W. (1977). *Face-to-face interaction: Research, methods, and theory*. New York: John Wiley.

Garfinkel, H. (1967). *Studies in ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Goffman, E. (1963). *Behavior in public places: Notes on the social organization of gatherings*. New York: Free Press.

Goodwin, C. (1981). *Conversational organization: Interaction between speakers and hearers*. New York: Academic Press.

Goodwin, C. (1984). Notes on story structure and the organization of participation. In M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action* (pp. 225-246). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Goodwin, C. (1986). Between and within: Alternative treatments of continuers and assessments. *Human Studies, 9*, 205-217.

Goodwin, C. (1987). Forgetfulness as an interactive resource. *Social Psychology Quarterly, 50*, 115-130.

Goodwin, C., & Goodwin, M. H. (1987). Concurrent operations on talk: Notes on the interactive organization of assessments. *IPrA Papers in Pragmatics, 1*, 1-52.

Goodwin, M. H. (1980). Processes of mutual monitoring implicated in the production of description sequences. *Sociological Inquiry, 50*, 303-317.

Heath, C. (1984). Talk and recipiency: Sequential organization in speech and body movement. In

J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action* (pp. 247-265). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heath, C. (1986). *Body movement and speech in medical interaction.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Heritage, J. (1984). *Garfinkel and ethnomethodology.* Cambridge: Polity Press.

Heritage, J., & Atkinson, J. M. (1984). Introduction. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action* (pp. 1-16). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Holmes, D. (1984). Explicit-implicit address. *Journal of Pragmatics, 8,* 311-320.

Jefferson, G. (1973). A case of precision timing in ordinary conversation: Overlapped tag-positioned address terms in closing sequences. *Semiotica, 9,* 47-96.

Jefferson, G. (1983). Caveat speaker: Preliminary notes on recipient topic-shift implicature. *Tilburg Papers in Language and Literature, 30.*

Jefferson, G. (1984). Notes on a systematic deployment of the acknowledgement tokens "Yeah" and "Mm hm." *Papers in Linguistics, 17,* 197-216.

Kendon, A. (1967). Some functions of gaze-direction in social interaction. *Acta Psychologica, 26,* 22-63.

Krippendorff, K. (1969). Models of messages: Three prototypes. In G. Gerbner, O. Holsti, K. Krippendorff, W. Paisley, & P. Stone (Eds.), *Analysis of communication content.* New York: John Wiley.

Levinson, S. C. (1983). *Pragmatics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Maynard, D. W. (1984). *Inside plea bargaining: The language of negotiation.* New York: Plenum.

Rogers, L. E., & Farace, R. B. (1975). Analysis of relational communication in dyads: New measurement procedures. *Human Communication Research, 1,* 222-239.

Sacks, H. (1967). Unpublished class lectures.

Sacks, H. (1984). Notes on methodology. In J. M. Atkinson & J. Heritage (Eds.), *Structures of social action* (pp. 21-27). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sacks, H., Schegloff, E., & Jefferson, G. (1974). A simplest systematics for the organization of turn-taking for conversation. *Language, 50,* 696-735.

Schegloff, E. A. (1968). Sequencing in conversational openings. *American Anthropologist, 70,* 1075-1095.

Schegloff, E. A. (in press). Between macro and micro: Contexts and other connections. In J. Alexander, B. Giesen, R. Munch, & N. Smelser (Eds.), *The micro-macro link.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Schegloff, E. A., Jefferson, G., & Sacks, H. (1977). The preference for self-correction in the organization of repair in conversation. *Language, 53,* 361-382.

Schenkein, J. (1978). *Studies in the organization of conversational interaction.* New York: Academic Press.

Seigman, A. W. (1979). Cognition and hesitation in speech. In A. W. Seigman & S. Feldstein (Eds.), *Of speech and time: Temporal speech patterns in interpersonal contexts* (pp. 151-178). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum.

Stiles, W. B. (1981). Classification of intersubjective illocutionary acts. *Language in Society, 10,* 227-249.

Zimmerman, D. H., & West, C. (Eds.). (1980). [Special double issue on language and social interaction]. *Sociological Inquiry, 50.*